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Kohl finds Europe a hard row to hoe

...hancellor Kohl is finding it tough going in Europe.

...e has come to realise, like others ...re him, that appeals to the common ...e of the other nine Common Mar... countries are not much use. Nor are ...cessions in advance.

...he Kohl government has made a ...ber of advance concessions for the ...opean Community's sake. They in...:

...he go-ahead for a DM7bn EEC ... to improve the economic climate ...poorer Common Market member...tries;

...he decision not to insist on higher ...ty and environmental standards in ...hope that agreement among the ... countries will then be easier to ...ch (which remains to be seen);

...nd revaluation of the deutsche...k by five per cent to save France the ...miny of a more drastic devaluation ...he franc.

...rance and other countries that deva... their currencies in the EMS mone... moves have shown their "gratitu...

IN THIS ISSUE

...for Bonn's obliging behaviour by ...ing on a four- to five-per-cent cut ...e 13-per-cent offset levy on farm ...rts from other EEC countries.

...is levy is imposed on farm imports ...ermany to offset the effect of cur...y revaluations on farm prices and ...mes.

...e others want it to be reduced even ... guarantees are lower this year in ...many than in 1982.

... the background, behind all this ...aining, there is a pledge by Herr ...l to make generous changes to EEC provisions for Mediterranean agriculture.

The aim behind this pledge is to dispel the reservations France, Italy and Greece have about allowing Spain and Portugal to join the European Community.

At the Brussels EEC summit in March the Chancellor was so keen on harmony that he still felt he sensed cordiality, mutual understanding and a common sense of will.

But they failed to stand up to closer scrutiny in the cold, clear light of reality. A variety of national interests and though the result might be that farm domestic considerations have gained greater importance, both in Bonn and elsewhere.

How else could the Bonn Cabinet have instructed Agriculture Minister Ignaz Kiechle to aim, at the Luxembourg farm price talkathon, at a three-per-cent increase for German farmers?

Bonn must surely know how much better-off German farmers are than their counterparts in other EEC countries and that the Common Agricultural Policy will force the Finance Minister this year, or next at the latest, to rifle the taxpayer's pockets yet again.

A cold chill must creep down the Chancellor's back when he calls to mind the June Stuttgart EEC summit.

As current chairman of the Ten he preferred not to upset the general harmony of the March summit by risking disputes on decisions.

So an unprecedented number of decisions are due to be reached at Stuttgart on topics ranging from youth unemployment, free trade within the EEC, acid rain, coal and steel and the Mediterranean package to the reorientation of EEC finances. At the end of Bonn's spell in the chair a clear step forward was to have been taken, whereas a wide range of people are now worried the Stuttgart summit might turn out to be a fiasco. They include German diplomat at the EEC who are struggling through the preliminaries and both Gaston Thorn, the president of the European Commission, and Piet Dankert, Speaker of the European Assembly.

More is at stake than Helmut Kohl's reputation as a statesman. An obvious failure would discourage all member-governments for some time and harm the EEC's prestige in the United States, Japan and the developing countries.

The respect shown by Moscow and Washington for the countries of Central Europe would take a knock too.

Cordiality will not be enough at Stuttgart. A rule will be run over the Chancellor's successes at the EEC in June.

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 27 April 1983)



British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl at 10 Downing Street. Mrs Thatcher later described the talks as "the best we've had". (Photo: AP)

Chancellor at Downing Street

EEC finance was one of the main issues when Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl met British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in London.

But little was agreed: instead, the clouds of another unpleasant budget dispute gathered on the horizon.

Chancellor Kohl flew back disappointed on one point at least: he had wanted more support for moves towards European integration.

But Mrs Thatcher made it clear that she expects Europe to take smaller, more pragmatic steps in this direction.

There was solid agreement on *Ostpolitik* and defence matters and on solidarity with the Americans.

At the Stuttgart EEC summit next month, Mrs Thatcher would like to see a settlement on the dispute over EEC finances. Full steam ahead into the European future would not be possible until Britain had made sure it would pay less into the EEC kitty.

Yet both leaders demonstrated how the most intensive political friendship can be maintained without any real headway being made on major issues. She described the talks as "the best we've had."

Kohl in London created the impression of being an extraordinarily personable politician, serious yet kind-hearted.

Alongside Britain's Iron Lady he cannot have failed to make an impression. In the long run it could prove a substantial contribution toward European unity.

Rainer Bonhorst

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 23 April 1983)

The political message behind the Beirut bomb blast

The bomb blast at the US embassy in Beirut was not just a killer: it accomplished a major political mission.

It reminded the United States what political forces are at large in the Lebanon and that a settlement there is impossible unless their interests are taken into account.

The blast is also fresh proof for those who either fail to appreciate or try to ignore how unreliable and fragile any agreement between Israel and Lebanon really is.

Six months ago a similar bomb blast that shook the Phalange headquarters in the heart of Beirut brought to an abrupt end high-flown Israeli hopes, expectations and aspirations.

The Lebanese President-elect, Bashir Gemayel, was killed. His place may have been taken by his brother Amin, but an entirely different political note was sounded.

The shock waves of the latest explosion were immediately registered by sensitive political seismographs in Jerusalem.

President Reagan was at pains to make a personal statement that the blast had strengthened US determination to arrive at a political settlement in Lebanon and the Middle East.

But the first reactions behind the scenes were not long in coming. Talks between Israeli, Lebanese and US delegates were cancelled.

At the same time the White House has stepped up the tempo of its bid to negotiate a settlement. It had already sensed with frustration that prospects of a settlement in the Lebanon were being talked away in view of the substantial remaining differences between Beirut and Jerusalem.

Now the sole remaining point at issue is Major Haddad, the commander of

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■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Libya: a case for delicate handling

Relations with Libya are at a low ebb again. Eight Germans have been arrested in Tripoli and accused of espionage. They are claimed to have been working for the CIA.

They are arguably being held as hostages for two Libyans currently standing trial in Bonn. The Libyans are presumably friends or supporters of the Libyan head of state and revolutionary leader, Col. Gaddafi.

They have been charged with torturing fellow-countrymen at the Libyan embassy in Bonn.

The Bonn Foreign Office has rejected a verbal protest by the Libyan government that sounded a threatening undertone with regard to the German legal authorities.

Having been referred to the Justice Ministry it was even mentioned in court in Bonn.

It seems reasonable to assume that Libya would like to trade the eight Germans it is holding for the Libyans in the dock in Bonn.

But how is headway to be made without one side or the other losing prestige?

Jürgen Möllemann, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, flew to Tripoli in a bid to clarify matters. He and his Libyan hosts agreed that ties were worth improving and in need of improvement.

This was a reaffirmation of the cordial relations that have characterised political and economic ties between Libya and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Bonn has never, for instance, taken part in moves by other states aimed at isolating Libya politically.

Libya, for that matter, did not break off ties with Bonn, as other Arab states did, when the Federal Republic recognised Israel and exchanged ambassadors with the Jewish state.

The decision not to do so was taken by the government of King Idris, but it was a policy maintained after the revolution by Col. Gaddafi.

Economic and trade ties have always been splendid. Last year Libya exported goods, primarily oil, worth DM7.2bn to the Federal Republic.

That made Libya Bonn's third-largest supplier, and oil imports from Libya were up despite an overall decline in oil imports by Germany.

In 1982 Libya imported goods worth DM2.8bn from the Federal Republic.

For years there have been between 3,000 and 4,000 Germans working in Libya: in oil, industrialisation and roadbuilding. There are so many partly because of the level of imports from Germany.

They mostly live alone, away from their families, in what is a strictly Muslim country, although a few are married to Libyan women.

Nearly a third of Libyan imports from the Federal Republic are motor vehicles, a fifth electrical engineering and a further fifth machinery.

So technological assistance from the country of origin is welcome.

In the struggle against international terrorism Bonn Interior Minister Gerhart Baum sought Libyan cooperation in the late-1970s, but with only limited success.

He too flew to Libya in 1980 to persuade Col. Gaddafi to exercise greater restraint in backing Palestinian terrorists, especially when their activities were, by virtue of their ties with German urban guerrillas, directed against the Federal Republic.

It is now admitted that Herr Baum's visit failed to achieve specific results. The Interior Ministry's expectations were not fulfilled.

The Libyan leaders admire German doctors and medical equipment. Libyan authorities prefer German doctors and clinics in cases where their own are less satisfactory.

Many Libyans from all walks of life have been treated at German university hospitals, including Bonn's, in recent years.

Col. Gaddafi himself (incognito, of course) underwent a thorough check at a Wiesbaden clinic some years ago.

The Libyan authorities also send ordinary patients, people who could not possibly afford medical treatment abroad themselves, to Germany for treatment.


There has been no lack of periodic visits by political leaders. Bonn Foreign Minister Genscher was in Tripoli in 1979; Libyan Vice-President Djalloud was in Bonn in 1981.

Col. Gaddafi, however, has yet to visit Bonn. He has expressed a wish to pay the Federal Republic an official visit. He has been invited and the invitation has been confirmed.

But it is felt that a date ought not to be set until the visit is sure to be a success, and a number of problems first need solving.

From Bonn's viewpoint they include Libyan activities abroad, as in Chad, and the way disputes between pro-and anti-Gaddafi Libyans are waged in other countries.

They also include the alarming conditions under which four Germans sen-



tenced in Libya some time ago are kept in prison there.

They were charged with divulging classified information, insulting the Libyan authorities, smuggling and offences in connection with alcohol.

In their case Bonn has long urged the Libyan authorities to make the conditions under which they are held in prison more humane.

Most of these problems, as Bonn sees it, are the result of conditions in Libya, including revolutionary ideas and the special role of the people's committees, whose activities are not subject to government instructions.

Much would be gained if the two states were to agree to respect each other's legal system and political structure, and Bonn would be prepared to do so.

But it expects the Libyan authorities to appreciate that it can neither directly nor indirectly influence German courts and can forbid neither friends nor foes of Col. Gaddafi from expressing their views as long as they do not resort to violence.

The Libyan authorities have also been informed about German legal procedure in connection with convicted foreign nationals, which is that the decision on what is opportune is reached by the *Länder*.

It is they and not Bonn who decide whether it is the national interest to deport a convicted foreigner or make him serve his sentence.

Dieter von König

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 21 April 1983)

Questions over death at Berli[n] East-West checkpoint

The death of a West German traveller in the GDR raises more questions than can be answered.

The GDR customs officers have only themselves to blame for suspicions that their interrogation methods might have contributed to the death of Rudolf Burkert, 43.

His body was shipped home to Hamburg with an unsatisfactory death certificate saying heart attack and no further explanation. This was certain to give rise to suspicion.

The East German authorities were not very tactful: they demanded DM2,500 for the transport.

The GDR did not see fit to comment in greater detail until the story hit the headlines, and there was inexplicable foot-dragging by Bonn officials too.

Under interrogation, said the GDR, the deceased had collapsed and fallen from his seat. His head had hit the ribs of a radiator. The interrogation had been conducted in a correct manner, as was usual in the GDR.

This explanation would account for his external injuries. It also tallies with the picture of the dead man with a long, straight cut over one eye.

If only the GDR authorities had accounted for the tragic mishap promptly and in greater detail there would have been no speculation about third-degree treatment by the customs officers.

Bonn ministries responsible for transit traffic through the GDR to and from West Berlin have yet to register a case in which violence has been used in interrogating transit travellers.

"We would be most surprised if Herr Burkert's death were to turn out to have been the result of maltreatment," says a Bonn Ministry official.

True enough, in transit traffic to and from Berlin there are constant complaints and disputes about the interpretation of the transit agreement, which forms part of the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin.

But they are few and far between in relation to the numbers of travellers, and cases of genuine harassment by GDR customs or People's Police officers are rare.

Since the Four-Power Agreement took effect in June 1972 the number of overland travellers to and from Berlin has more than doubled to 16 million a year.

This figure alone shows how much more smoothly traffic now runs, and over the entire period about 1,200 Germans and 100 foreigners have been arrested by the GDR authorities for misuse of the transit routes.

The overwhelming majority were brought to book for trying to help would-be refugees to escape from the GDR or for leaving the transit route.

Other charges have been causing a serious traffic accident, drunken driving, breaches of customs and foreign exchange regulations and espionage.

All complaints are raised and dealt with at meetings of the joint transit commission, which has just held its 73rd session.

There are several hundred complaints a year. The commission is said not to keep a record of the exact number. It is a very small proportion in view of the number of travellers.

Most complaints are about extremely high fines for speeding (up to DM300 or more), about people being turned back at the border without goo[d] and about what has seemed of[...] a growing number of random c[...]

By the terms of the transit a[...] travellers are not allowed to [...] take receipt of material, to giv[e] lifts, to leave the transit route[...] good reason, to commit crimina[l] ces or to contravene the highwa[y]

If there are specific reason[s] specting a transit traveller of b[...] any of these regulations he and [...] hicle may be checked.

The number of spot checks [...] tainly increased, from 292 in [...] 604 last year. In none of the[se] were suspicions borne out; o[...] there would have been more [...] arrests.

Motorists who drive thro[ugh the] GDR to Berlin and stick to t[...] need not, as a rule, be worr[ied...] GDR authorities had every ri[ght to in]terrogate Rudolf Burkert, w[...] arranged to meet relatives en ro[ute...]

At the meeting place he hand[ed...] goods. His passenger said they [...] sweets and sports badges. Th[...] said they were seat belts, a lo[...] and a clock.

Difficulties often occur whe[n...]ing unforeseen happens, suc[h as the] case of the young man whose c[ar broke] down on Whit Sunday.

He had to wait a day and a h[alf until] a breakdown van arrived. All h[e had to] eat and drink was half a doze[n bottles] of beer he happened to have wi[th him].

The GDR border guards wo[uld not let] him out of the country until th[ey had] checked his story, which adm[ittedly was] hard to believe.

In another case a schoolboy [...] hitchhiking from West Ger[many to] West Berlin was involved in a tr[affic ac]cident.

He was given medical tr[eatment...] questioned by the People's Po[lice and] then dumpted by them at an [...] filling station.

Since travellers are not allo[wed to] pick people up en route he had [to wait] for half a day until someone to[ok pity] on him and gave him a lift to W[est Ber]lin.

In both cases it was impossib[le to get] in touch with relatives: either [the] telephones were out of order or [...] they took only GDR money.

There is no point of contact [in the] West where details of accidents [on the] transit routes are registered, a[nd not] every worried relative has the [...] idea of ringing Bonn's perman[ent mis]sion in East Berlin and asking h[...]

Joachim Ne[...]

(Die Welt, 21 A[...])

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HOME AFFAIRS

The government is over the first hurdle: now it goes on to the next

[T]he Bonn coalition has organised itself quickly following the election: the top jobs have been allocated, [poli]cy for the immediate future has [bee]n decided, and points of disagree[men]t have been quietly set aside.

[It] can now settle down to four years [in] office without worrying about the [dan]gers — and dangers there will be.

[O]n the conservative side there is the [pos]sibility of friction between the CDU [and] the CSU. The cause could well be a [...]e up involving Franz Josef Strauss, [so]mething the volatile Bavarian is al[way]s capable of.

[T]he differences are not likely to in[vol]ve who holds what job. That has [alread]y been settled. The cause is likely to [be] social policy and, closely linked to [i]t, finance.

[B]ut such a dispute would probably [not] be confined to CDU versus CSU. It [cou]ld probably mean disputes within [the] CDU itself. In such a case, the con[serv]atives would be divided into those [want]ing strict austerity (cutbacks in ge[ner]al spending and social benefits) and [tho]se wanting a more comprehensive [soci]al policy.

[D]ifferences on social and money is[sue]s among conservatives could one[...] spread to the Free Democrats.

[T]he FDP is certain to want to sell it[sel]f as the free enterprise party in gene-

ral and the party of businessmen (large and small) and the self-employed in particular.

It aim would be to keep some of the conservative voters who gave the Liberals their second vote in the general election.

Such a policy could lead to tension in the CDU/CSU which can never fully ignore its Christian-Social basic tenets and which has had a special "labour party" image since the last election.

At the same time, the FDP could be looking for voters with radically liberal ideas on interior and justice policy.

The Liberals could say to themselves: many of the voters in the general election gave their votes to us because they wanted the conservatives to win. They won't do it again under less dramatic conditions.

What could therefore happen is that only very few of the conservatives who voted for the FDP would remain loyal — in any event, not enough to corner the five per cent minimum vote needed for representation in the Bundestag.

Thus, the argument goes, it must try to win over those radically liberal voters who voted for the SPD on 6 March and now consider themselves to have made a mistake.

There is the possibility that the FDP will start worrying about its identity.

It would above all be Count Lambsdorff's job to put across the image of economic liberalism, perhaps together with Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

But there could also be a person-related image-building drive on top of the programmatic one — and Gerhart Baum, deputy party chairman, is bound to be standing in the wings.

But the conservatives could hardly agree to the FDP's radical-liberal demands. So there could be disputes.

For the coalition as a whole there are dangers looming in some of the most important policy areas of its programme.

This would include money and social policies. It would prove disastrous for the government to give repeated assurances that all budgetary holes have been plugged, all social benefits ensured and all painful belt-tightening over and done with — only to have to say later that the forecasts were wrong, the measures inadequate and that new cutbacks were inevitable.

This would result in a loss of credibility and would mean that the people would consider their government incapable and, ultimately, dishonest.

The other major source of danger to the coalition lies in security and alliance policy. Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher want to implement the two-track Nato missiles decision together with America if the Geneva arms limitation talks bring no results by the end of the year.

Pressure against this will grow rapidly in the next few months: in the Bundestag, in leftist publications and in the streets.

The peace movement now has an extended arm in the form of the Greens in the Bundestag.

The peace movement hopes, with good reason, that the SPD is getting closer to rejecting the missile deployment. It also pins its hopes on strong segments of the trade unions.

We must be prepared for the use by the peace movement of violent masses to spearhead the protest against the deployment of US missiles.

In this situation, the coalition could be tempted to urge Washington to make ever new compromise proposals in Geneva and, ultimately, to postpone the missile deployment.

Kohl and Genscher would have to resist this from the very beginning because if the Western arms buildup founders on the Federal Republic of Germany the very core of the Western Alliance would be destroyed.

And if this were to happen the Bonn government would lose both strength and reputation.

Johann Georg Reissmüller

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 22 April 1983)

SPD arms itself for assault on the citadel of Munich

[T]he Social Democrats have chosen a former Mayor of Munich, Georg [Kr]onawitter, to contest the municipal [elec]tion there next March.

Kronawitter, 52, was picked over two [othe]r candidates on the first ballot. His [sel]ection is significant. Munich has be[com]e a symbol of the SPD decline in [the] cities of Germany. It has never been [in c]ontrol of so few metropolitan coun[cils].

[Si]nce, it was the conservative parties [who] mounted attacks on the "red city [cou]ncils". Now the SPD is gearing it[self] to bounce back and retake them.

Kronawitter said jubilantly after his [elec]tion: "The Social Democrats have [put t]he 1970s behind."

[H]e was referring to the party's fac[tion]fighting during those years, which [was] nowhere as fierce as in Munich.

[K]ronawitter succeeded the popular [Hans]-Jochen Vogel as Mayor in 1972. [He r]emained in power until 1978 when [the] SPD did not renominate him fol[lowin]g factional rows.

[Th]at was when the present Mayor, [Erich] Kiesl of the CSU, was voted in.

[Si]nce 1970 the SPD has lost an enor[mou]s amount of ground in the cities. It [has] lost three major cities of symbolic [valu]e, Munich, Frankfurt and Berlin.

[A]ll that remains in Bavaria is Aschaf[fen]burg, Augsburg and Würzburg if one [re]gards the special case Nuremberg [whe]re Urschlechter has managed to re[mai]n in control despite quarrelling with [his] party.

[In] Hesse, the Social Democrats still [hold] Darmstadt and Kassel — with the [help] of the Greens. But in Frankfurt, [Wal]ter Wallmann (CDU) has managed [to b]uild up an image that adds up to a [hall]mark of Christian Democratic mu[nici]pal politics.

[T]he SPD position in Baden-Württem[ber]g is even weaker. In Stuttgart, Manfred Rommel (CDU) has become something like the living proof of the contention that even difficult cities are governable and that they can in fact be governed with a liberal hand.

That leaves the SPD with Freiburg and Mannheim. The party is thinking of nominating a young municipal politician for the new election in Mannheim whose mayor, Wilhelm Varnholt, has died.

The City patriarch of Bremen, Hans Koschnick, Hamburg's imaginative Klaus von Dohnanyi, Saarbrücken's outspoken and popular Oskar Lafontaine and Hanover's expert and populist Herbert Schmalstieg complete the list, apart from a few traditional bastions in the Ruhr area and other parts of North Rhine-Westphalia.

For those asking about the reasons for this decline, the Social Democrats have long had a long, varied, intelligent and above all conflicting list of explanations. Times have changed.

Today, the Social Democrats are frequently punished for the mistakes of the past. As long as the municipalities' main concern was reconstruction and, later, more benefits for all, municipal policy was more or less a matter of course.

It was not until the social structure changed, the people became conscious of the inhospitability of the cities and yesterday's progress was seen as today's crisis that municipal policy itself became a problem.

The crisis of the cities was to become a crisis of the SPD.

On the one hand, the cities are a typical SPD domain because social change is fastest there and conditions of life and work change sooner in the cities than elsewhere.

And the SPD can adjust more easily than the conservative parties. On the other hand, this also means that conflicts that crop up daily in municipal work catch up sooner with the SPD.

These conflicts have torn the party. Should it — due to the new social structure — become the party of the new middle class or of the new minorities? A party of landlords or of tenants? Of Germans or foreigners? Of squatters or landlords? Should it be a party of quality of life or the party of a city geared to the car?

Only where social structures have remained intact has the SPD managed to hold its position: Heinrich Eickelbeck in Bochum, Horst Katzor in Essen, Manfred Urbanski in Herne — they all seem like archetypes of a region where industry, public services and SPD are more closely knit than anywhere else.

It is no exaggeration to say that Dortmund's Mayor, Günter Samtlebe, was heaved into the Rathaus by the Hoesch steel mill. And in fact, he is still an honorary director of the company.

What is to be done? The lost consensus reflected inthe factionalism within the SPD cannot be restored from above.

Social Democrats seeking an answer know that they have to forge a new municipal policy concept that will give them identity once more. This is a sisyphean task — and in the end the concept is unlikely from those of Christian Democratic mayors.

Even more important, some Social Democrats argue, is to come to realise again that politics is nowhere as palpable and visible as in the cities. The days when the SPD was able to brush this aside because it was in control at the centres of power are over.

Social policy starts at the bottom, and this will probably be the yardstick by which Social Democrats will be measured — much more so than their attitude towards missiles.

At the moment, the SPD seems to have dug up an old and trite success recipe to the effect that what it needs is better people.

If the SPD could compose its dream politician he would be a blend of populist patriarch and young hero — something like Hans-Jochen Vogel in the late 1960s when he eagerly wore the chains of his mayoral office. If only such people could be pulled out of a hat.

There is, however, a small consolation for the Social Democrats in their tedious search. There was a time when anyone who wanted to make a career in the party moved to the centre of power. But Klaus von Dohnanyi left the centre to go Hamburg — and was successful. Rolf Böhme has demonstrated in the difficult city of Freiburg that it can be rewarding to turn one's back on Bonn.

Such facts are no guarantee of success for the SPD, but they do offer a chance.

Acting along these lines, Heidelberg's Social Democrats want to import Albrecht Müller from Bonn to stand in the municipal election. Müller was the Helmut Schmidt's imaginative chief of planning at the Chancellery.


Gunter Hofmann

(Die Zeit, 15 April 1983)



■ PEOPLE

Nation pays its tribute to a German intellectual



Richard Löwenthal, publicist, SPD ideologue and independent intellectual par excellence, has turned 75.

Löwenthal made an international name for himself as a scholar and researcher of world communism and analyser of the West's political culture.

He has been an active SPD member since the 1930s — after a brief spell as a communist student leader — and is the deputy chairman of the Social Democrats' basic values commission.

The SPD marked his birthday with a major celebration in Bonn and the nation paid tribute to the scholar with the award to him by President Karl Carstens of the *Grosses Bundesverdienstkreuz mit Stern*, one of the most coveted German orders of merit.

To mark his 70th birthday five years ago, Berlin's Free University held an international academic symposium, presenting Löwenthal with a voluminous special publication with contributions by fellow academics and German and foreign politicians. He was also awarded Berlin's Ernst Reuter Plaque.

All these marks of homage testify to the world-wide esteem in which Löwenthal is held and bear witness to the extensive range of his activities.

"Rix" — as his friends call him — can look back on a life full of ups and downs and intellectual adventure marked by singlemindedness of purpose and the personal charisma it takes to put one's stamp on an era.

He owes his success to his unflagging energy, his lively intellect, commitment to a cause and the undaunted courage with which he has repeatedly intervened to bring order or clarity into a confused era.

He earned his Ph.D. at Heidelberg University in 1931. Immediately after Hitler came to power and banned the SPD, Löwenthal joined the socialist resistance group *Neu Beginnen* (New Beginning).

Together with this group, he went first to Czechoslovakia (in 1933) and later to Britain.

In these two countries and in France he published a great many essays under the pseudonym Paul Sering, which was soon to become widely known.

After the war, he was first a foreign correspondent of the London *Observer*, working for a while in Yugoslavia and Germany. Back in Britain, he became the paper's foreign affairs commentator.

By that time, he already has a firm reputation as a publicist throughout the English-speaking world.

On the German Social Democratic scene, Paul Sering made a comeback in early 1947 with his much quoted *Jenseits des Kapitalismus* (Beyond Capitalism).

He wanted the SPD to become a clear political part of Western democracy while acting as an economically independent "third force" between capitalism and communism in its ties with other socialist parties in Europe.

At that time, Löwenthal still regarded himself as a Marxist. But he later publicly revised large passages of this concept under the impact of Europe's post-war history.

Much of his subsequent work was devoted to the analysis of the structures and trends of world communism, with special emphasis on the Soviet Bloc, China and the Western communist parties. It was here that he excelled with *undisputed mastery and authority*.

In recognition of his expertise in this field he was appointed to the Otto Suhr Institute and the Eastern Europe Institute of Berlin's Free University in 1961. This marked the final transition from journalistic to scholarly work.

Löwenthal intantly expanded his academic work beyond Berlin by attending many international congresses abroad, by becoming a member of several foreign societies, by lecture tours and by research work in Stanford, Tel Aviv, Oxford, New York, Berkeley, North Carolina and many other places.

All important Western publications have been open to him and have welcomed his foreign affairs and cultural analysis.

He was for many years the top political adviser of Willy Brandt. He and Brandt wrote a biography of Ernst Reuter which was published in 1957.

Later, he supported Helmut Schmidt's efforts to keep the SPD on a course committed to the Western alliance.

In the past few years, Löwenthal has repeatedly tried to persuade the Social Democrats from going along with short-lived fads and flirting with the "alternative scene." He has stressed that the Social Democrats' main function is to promote and uphold the social interests and democratic traditions of industrial labour.


He has occasionally clashed with his old friend Willy Brandt, as during the student unrest of the 1960s.

He was so disturbed by the higher education policy of the Social Democrats that he helped to establish the *Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft* (freedom of science federation) becoming the organisation's first national president.

He opted out of the federation later when he felt that a conflict with the SPD was in the offing.

Here, too, it became obvious that Löwenthal's intellectual and political home is the SPD, despite his criticism of the party on individual issues.

Democratic socialism is for him an indispensable productive element of democratic political culture. And this will remain so as long as the SPD itself abides by this concept, adds positive substance to it and defends it.



Richard Löwenthal ... activ[e] since 1930s.

In this, Richard Löwenthal ... proval beyond party lines ... only be hoped that we shall ... benefit for many more years ... incisive and brilliantly formu... tributions to our political li... his outbursts when others pro... to be slow in grasping. But h... ways been quick to revert to ... crystal-clear rationality.

We all and our still-young d... cannot afford not to take adv... his Anglo-Saxon experience ... sights.

Alexander S...

(Der Tagesspiegel, ...)

Kohl confidant is top Bonn administrator

A professor of philosophy, Waldemar Schreckenberger, is Chancellor Kohl's chief administrator — that is, State Secretary at the Chancellery.

Schreckenberger has been a close friend and confidant of the Chancellor for a long time — they were friends at school.

His baptism at Bonn was one of fire. It happened when during the final phase of the coalition talks, the general secretary of the CSU, Edmund Stoiber, accused him of keeping the minutes incorrectly.

Schreckenberger's denial was abnormally sharp for a normally restrained person.

Making mock of himself, Schreckenberger once described himself as a "sort of failed scientist."

He admits tht he found it "more tempting to be able to influence political processes than to lead a professorial life."


And indeed, the post in which he has succeeded Globke, Carstens, Ehmke, Schüler, Konow and Lahnstein is the most influential administrative position in Bonn.


As a former department head in the Rhineland-Palatinate government, head of the State Chancellery and state Minister of Justice, Schreckenberger has plenty of experience to fall back on.

The fact that he is a schoolfriend of Kohl furthered his career in Rhineland-Palatinate and the personal trust the Chancellor puts in him has earned him his present post.

A perfect understanding between the Chancellor and his chief administrator has been essential for this office for all Chancellors from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Schmidt.

Schreckenberger's career began in 1960 — not as a university professor but as *assessor* in a district government in Rhineland-Palatinate. This was so despite the fact that he was the assistant of Werner Maihofer (one of the fathers of the Freiburg FDP programme) during his doctoral work in Saarbrucken.





Waldemar Schreckenberger ... the restrained professor.

(Photo: Bundesbildstelle)

On top of his government work — he had meanwhile become the head of the Department for Legislation and Administration at the Rhineland-Palatinate Chancellery in Mainz — Schreckenberger took time off to earn himself a professorship. The leave of absence was granted to him by Helmut Kohl, then prime minister of Rhineland-Palatinate.

Schreckenberger has no political idols, not even Konrad Adenauer whom, as he says, he considered too authoritarian when he was young.

Unlike Kohl, who like no other post-war chancellor lays claim to being the successor of famous statesmen, Schreckenberger has no politician wh[o he re]gards as an ideal.

He prefers to lean on such ph[i]losophers as Kant, Descartes ... muel von Puffendorf. As he ... the exception rather than th... politicians to come up with gr...

This cautious aloofness from ... gedly all-encompassing creati... of politics — and hence also ... ness from his own Chancellor ... to Schreckenberger's commi... tantism. But this did not pre... from taking a hand in for... school concordat between the ... and the Rhineland-Palatinate ... time as a public servant.

Schreckenberger's politica[l] ... public activities have not made ... dely known, except for his str... in favour of competing comm... non-commercial television ... lines of the British BBC and ITV.

Only with occasional state... he differed with the prevailing ... vative view that the squatting ... should be solved by using the ... code as an instrument.

Unlike most politicians, Sc... berger is not bent on image... and this along with his friend... Kohl played a major role in hi... pointment.

Ever since Globke, the Ch... post has been held by smooth... tioning or, as Schreckenberger ... "pragmatically serving" admi... rather than men with ambitions ... own.

Though "the spirit of Glo[bke has] gone from the Chancellery," th... requirement of smooth functio... remained unchanged.

So far, there have been no ma... takes made at the Chancellery ... least, none have become know[n].

Schreckenberger heads the ... officials, organisers agenda ... chanceller and personally shield... Since Kohl is inclined to ...

Continued on page 1[0]

BUSINESS

Bunny on the run: US sales of VW Rabbit plummet

[V]olkswagen executives in the United States still have fond memories of [the] 1979/80 oil crisis when motorists [queued] in line at filling stations for ga[so]line at $1.50 a gallon.

[F]uel was scarce and everyone expect[ed] it to grow even more expensive. [The]re seemed to be no choice but to [swit]ch to small cars that used less gaso[line].

[T]hose were the days, when there was [not] a car to match the Rabbit, the US-[bu]ilt version of the Volkswagen Golf, [fo]r fuel economy.

Americans were particularly impress[ed] by the diesel-engined Rabbit, a [wo]rld champion fuel miser. There were [wa]iting lists of six to nine months for [th]e Rabbit diesel, which is still the most [ec]onomic car on the market.

US car-buyers even allowed themsel[ve]s to be pressured by hard-nosed VW [de]alers into buying superfluous extras [in] order to make sure of a Rabbit diesel.

The oil crisis has long been forgotten. [Fuel] is readily available and gasoline [sel]ls here and there at less than a dollar [a g]allon again.

The Rabbit, after having emerged the ... winner of the 1979/80 crisis, is [cu]rrently in the throes of the most se[ri]ous crisis it has undergone since being [la]unched in the US market.

It is increasingly clear that Americans [d]on't really like small cars, and certain[ly] not the Rabbit any more.

"They want economy models, but not [sma]ll cars," Roger B. Smith of General [Mo]tors says. And now gasoline is less [ex]pensive, economy no longer matters [as] much as it did.

What US motorists want are larger [mo]dels, and VW of America has none. [Pon]tiac, a General Motors division, has [res]urrected the Bonneville, which was [mo]thballed last year, and renamed it [the] Parisienne.

Chrysler are still manufacturing the [Ne]w Yorker, while Ford continue to [ma]ke the Crown Victoria and the Mer[cur]y Grand Marquis.

The largest Cadillac dealer in the [Un]ited States is running an advertising [cam]paign with the slogan: This is your [last] chance to buy a full-sized Cadillac; [nex]t year they're going to shrink.

The campaign has worked. Big is [bea]utiful again, although there is no [hi]ding the fact that the US automo[bile] industry is in the throes of a long-... crisis.

After three lean years, the worst crisis [the] industry has been through since the [earl]y 1930s, motor industry executives [in] Detroit are beginning to grasp that [bus]iness may not bounce back in Year ... either.

Sales in the first quarter of 1983 were [disa]ppointing, with compacts being hit [har]dest. Detroit invested roughly $30bn [in] the research and development of eco[nom]y compacts, and assembly lines are [run]ning at only 50 per cent of capacity.

Volkswagen have been hit even har[der] than the industry as a whole. In a [dec]lining market the VW Rabbit, as[se]mbled in the United States, is shed[din]g percentage points.

The Westmoreland assembly works, [op]ened in 1978, worked flat out from [Oc]tober 1980 to June 1981. "We could [sell] every car we made," recalls Peter Weiher, VW of America's head of marketing and sales.

But there has been a steady downturn since summer 1981. Last year alone the Westmoreland assembly lines were shut down for 23 weeks.

In January 1983 the facility was closed for a fortnight and second-shift workers were fired once and for all. But orders were not even enough to keep a single shift in constant employment.

In May and June the company is ordering a shutdown for another fortnight to reduce the stockpiles of unsold cars, and it is doubtful whether two weeks will be enough.

In the first 10 days of April only 111 Rabbits were sold, or roughly 57 per cent fewer than last year, while the Rabbit's share of the US market has slumped from a poor 1.8 to an abysmal 0.6 per cent.


The assembly works were designed for a daily output of roughly 1,000 cars. No-one can tell whether that many will ever be sold again.

VW executives have decided once and for all that they will not need the second assembly facility in Sterling Heights, where 180,000 Rabbits a year were to be built starting in 1984.

The first chief executive of VW of America, James McLernon, was worried in September 1981 that this additional capacity under construction at a cost of roughly DM500m might be available "too late rather than too soon."

Mr McLernon, who has since been fired, had nothing but a wan smile for sceptics who suspected that the cars that eventually rolled off the assembly lines at Sterling Heights might end up being Japanese models.

In this respect he has been proved



right. The new facility is being taken over by Chrysler.

Chrysler stepped in when construction was 80 per cent completed. No-one is saying how much they paid but there can be little doubt that Volkswagen have lost a packet on the deal.

Carl H. Hahn, board chairman of the Volkswagen parent company, says VW of America has become its No. 1 problem.

But his explanation for the current unsatisfactory state of affairs sounds strange coming from a salary-earning executive.

He says Volkswagen of America is in its predicament because it had too much entrepreneurial freedom.

Herr Hahn took the VW Beetle to America in the 1950s and 1960s and set Volkswagen up in business in the United States.

What he probably means is that Wolfsburg did not keep as close enough a check on its US subsidiary's operations. His predecessor, Toni Schmücker, let Mr McLernon have his head.

There can no longer be the slightest doubt that he did not put this entrepreneurial freedom to best use.

Even though the Westmoreland works have only been in operation for five years its facilities are no longer up to the latest requirements and VW's competitors have cut costs in comparison. Volkswagen have to ship in car body parts by truck from a pressed steel works in West Virginia. "We haven't yet quite achieved our competitors' level of automation," Mr Weiher admits. The unions initially negotiated wage deals that gave VW an advantage over other US manufacturers. But this advantage has quickly been sacrificed.

Wages at VW are now as high as at Ford and General Motors and a little higher than at Chrysler. The Westmoreland works does not break even until output is at 85 per cent of capacity.

Other manufacturers reach break-even point sooner, but as Mr Weiher points out, "no-one can make compacts at a profit when production is running at 50 per cent of capacity."

If the Rabbit were to sell at a profit people would have to be prepared to pay much higher prices, and they have long ceased to be prepared to do so.

Volkswagen of America has sold itself so hard as an all-American corporation that the Rabbit has forfeited any exotic attraction it might have retained.

"In a flight of fancy we Americanised the Rabbit too much," Herr Hahn is quoted as saying in an interview with *auto motor sport*.

"We made the mistake of designing our US model in such a way that a European would have driven straight into the first ditch with it," he said.

That was a performance rating customers could buy less expensively from other US manufacturers. What was more, trouble with the fuel injection and exhaust harmed the Rabbit's reputation.

Volkswagen no longer enjoy the reputation of manufacturing a particularly high-quality car, and deliberate re-Europeanisation of the Rabbit has failed to remedy this.

It may now have tauter suspension and a redesigned interior, but too many compacts on sale in the US market are the spitting image of the Rabbit.

Its Japanese competitors, manufactured by Toyota, Honda and Nissan, have a higher reputation these days than the US-made German car.


"Volkswagens aren't as highly rated as Japanese cars," says Dan Cass, a car dealer based on the outskirts of New York.

He is busy trying to sell his last VWs at a discount and plans to concentrate entirely on BMWs in future. He feels the BMW is a better seller.

The decline of the Rabbit's image is nowhere more clearly reflected than in sales statistics. Nearly all competing models have overtaken it.

There were nearly three times as many buyers in the first quarter of 1983 for the Nissan Sentra, the basic version of which costs about $1,000 less than the cheapest Rabbit.

The Honda Accord and Civic, the Toyota Tercel and Corolla, the American Motors Alliance and the GM, Ford and Chrysler compacts are all well ahead of the Rabbit in sales.



Volkswagen's Golf/Rabbit: driving with the wrong club.

(Cartoon: Luis Murschetz/Süddeutsche Zeitung)

So the smallest VW sold in the US market runs a risk of suffering a fate similar to that of its predecessor, the Beetle, which was a roaring success as an oddity in America and was not withdrawn until it was practically no longer saleable.

America, says Peter Weiher, is the world's most innovation-addicted market. In it the VW compact is increasingly assuming the role of a white elephant that worries Volkswagen dealers stiff.

Dealers are in a gloomy mood. In January they issued a statement to the effect that they were totally demoralised and had doubts as to the future because the present was so bleak and desolate.

Peter Liebman owns one of the largest VW dealerships in the United States and is chairman of the dealers' advisory council.

He would prefer to say nothing at all. "If you have nothing positive to say, you might as well say nothing." But after lengthy reflection something positive does occur to him.

Only the Honda Accord, he says, can measure up to the Rabbit. Its other competitors are all worse.

The Rabbit GTI, launched about six months ago, was extremely well received by the US public, while the VW Santana and Passat, marketed as the Quantum in the USA, were absolutely superb; the Americans had merely yet to appreciate them.

As an experienced car salesman he has a tale or two to tell of how little interest Americans can have in things technical.

He also sells Buicks and regularly has to work hard to persuade potential customer to test-drive the new model. Their last car was a Buick; it was fine, so why should they bother driving round the block in the latest one?

Most customers, he says, couldn't care less that the new Buick has a front-wheel drive, a new chassis and an up-to-date engine.

Technically the VW has much to offer, so this lack of customer interest is a sales handicap.

Auto advertising in the United States is unbelievably aggressive, conveying the impression that even sedate family saloons mainly serve the purpose of making a getaway from hired killers in the streets of San Francisco.

So Volkswagen try to sound a different note by emphasising German engineering, and with a modicum of suc-

Continued on page 10

■ HANOVER TRADE FAIR

Computer technology steals the show in a competitive field

Computer technology was the big success at the Hanover Trade Fair. In cold business terms, nothing else touched it.

But interest overall was high and the question now is: will the great interest shown at the world's largest capital goods fair be reflected in orders?

Data processing and communications technology is benefitting from the rationalisation of office work. The aim is to do two things at the same time: cut back on wage costs and cope with ever-increasing amounts of data.

Equipment is getting smaller all the time, meaning that it is becoming more and more practicable for office use.

Sales in other branches of industry were well behind. One spokesman for the fair said he knew of only one really large order outside the communications technology field: a DM1.2m order placed with a German plant and equipment supplier.

Business in the plant and mechanical and electrical engineering, the pillars of the capital goods industry, would have to pick up considerably in the next few months if interest at Hanover were to be reflected in orders.

But there is no sign so far that German industry as a whole is prepared to invest more this year than it did in 1982, which was a poor investment year.

It is almost impossible to assess the many specialised "fairs within a fair" that, after a long and arduous restructuring process, now make up the Hanover Fair.

There were great differences in all sectors; the broad sector of precision mechanics, for example, where efforts to streamline production processes still proceed.

The same applies to propulsion and conveyor technology.

In the machine tools and welding sectors, there was plenty of interest in the exhibits but there was no marked improvement in business.

In steel there were some signs of better business. But this was primarily due to the need to restock inventories.

The Hanover Fair reflected the growing complexity of modern technology. Systems that transcend specific branches of industry are gaining ground constantly, as shown by the increasingly intensive use of electronics in mechanical engineering.

This also makes it increasingly difficult for the potential buyer seeking solutions to his particular problems to obtain a clear picture,

All this has forced the Hanover Fair to restructure and depart from the previous strict division comprising branches of industry in favour of a comprehensive alternative.

The socalled microtronic section in Hanover is a telling example that marks the beginning of this process.

Microtronics is the interplay of various sectors of industry such as mechanical and electrical engineering, office and communications technology, energy technology and conveyor and transport technology. The organisers' aim here was to demonstrate the complex applications of the exhibits to a potential buyer.

There were no technical sensations at the fair but there were many technical novelties that were further developments of existing equipment.

Some examples: the world's first compact neon light housed in a light bulb rather than in a tube. The bulb fits any normal socket.

The 12-watt version of the Centralux light corresponds to a conventional 60-watt bulb. There is also a 16-watt version. Both are ignited by a special electronic starter. It will take a few months before the new light bulbs made by Osram GmbH become available to the public.

There was a portable electricity plant made specially for artisans an[...] market gardeners. The operatio[...] generator is surprisingly sim[...] four-stroke engine is started o[...] petrol. Once going, it switches [...]

This portable unit, which we[...] 25 kilos, will run for three hou[...] litres of diesel. (Makers: [...] GmbH, Pfullingen.)


People on mountain farms or [...] in hunting lodges will benefit [...] portable hydroelectric plant th[...] no foundations nor any lining [...] stream bed.

It is simply put straight i[...] stream. The plant provides a [...] 220 volts at 50 Hz with the h[...] electronic regulator. The outp[...] kva, and the plant causes no p[...] whatsoever. (Österreichisches [...] hungszentrum, Seibersdorf [...] Vienna.)

There was also a mobile high[...] mance generator that can be d[...] any automobile engine. The gen[...] useful as a source of energy fo[...] cal tools in areas that have no e[...] supply. (Goddard Enterprises, [...] toria Park, Australia.)

Various novelties were on sho[...] communications sector. A pock[...] device makes it possible to tra[...] legrams directly by radio. The [...] (OPTRX) is the size of a small [...] calculator. The owner is alerted [...] bration or a buzzing sound to [...] message of up to 160 units app[...] a small window of the device. ([...] la GmbH, Taunusstein.)

Helmut Maier-M[...]
and Wolf[...]
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 A[...])



Robots: the miracle-or-monster argument rages on

"The worst thing about robots is that people think they can do more than they really can," said one exhibitor at the Hanover Fair's newly established robot hall.

The crush of people was so great as he spoke that movement along the aisles was barely possible.

Some 90 exhibitors from all parts of the world demonstrated their mechanical men in Hall 13.

The idea that robots with their jointed arms have almost human capabilities has given them the image of job killers.

But the makers say their "programmable mechanical workers" are vital for the survival of German industry.

"Only those who use this miracle instrument in the future will be able to stand up to tough competition and maintain their income and affluence," says a spokesman for the Sekurja-Ingenieursgesellschaft.

If this chance is used, he maintains, Germany and Europe will enter the next century as an industrial power to be reckoned with. If not, they will degenerate into economic provincialism.

Thus even many makers of robots put some unwarranted faith into their capabilities. The new trade magazine *Robotec*, whose first issue came out just in time for the fair, says that "the days are over when it took courage even to say the word 'robot'."

The magazine blames the media for the horror vision the public associates with the machines.

As the magazine puts it, saying "the robots are coming" spreads as much fear as the cry "the Indians are coming" did in the Wild West.

To start with, robots are nothing but automatons. Only microprocessor technology has made it possible to programme these machines so that they can carry out a variety of commands.

By now, some of these robots are equipped with sensors enabling them to "see" and "feel" the materials they work on.

As a result, they know exactly how to assemble, weld, measure or align the individual part.

The main power behind the development of robots is the auto industry which now "employs" 60 per cent of these iron workers.

But the growing precision of robots could bring about a change. The most sophisticated models can turn the tiniest of screws with a precision of one-tenth of a millimetre and can thus be used in precision assembly work.

There are now 3,500 robots working in West Germany, 1,200 more than a year ago. Sweden is the world leader in the use of robots, outstripping Japan.

The two countries next in line, the USA and Germany, use roughly the same number of robots relative to their size.

Since human labour is predominant in the assembly of dishwashers, radios, typewriters and TV sets, experts estimate that there is a vast scope for robot expansion in these sectors. As a result, the advance of robots in these industries will be faster than elsewhere.

It is still unknown to what extent robots supplant human labour.

The Institute for Production Technology and Automation of the Stuttgart-based Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft estimates that half of today's 1.2 million assembly line jobs in this country are endangered.

But forecasts on the robots' effects on jobs are full of uncertainties, except for the obvious fact that rationalisation and automation boil down to replacing people by machines.

But experience in the auto industry, the biggest user of robots, seems to disprove this.

In 1981, Germany's auto-makers employed 660,000 people, 78,000 more than ten years earlier. The number of autos made in Germany did not rise but decline in that period: from about four million in 1971 to about 3.9 million in 1981.

Last December, Opel chief executive Ferdinand Beickler told the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany that growth did not "manifest itself in the number of units but in more sophisticated and more complex technology and hence the higher value of the vehicles produced."

Daimler-Benz boosted its labour force by 50 per cent in the past five years, using the extra labour only for the manufacture of extras. The pollution and noise abatement regulations in various countries also require additional staff, both in the production and the development sectors.

By now, the iron workers who do the welding, spraying, stacking of crankshafts and turning of sheetmetal are an integral part of the auto industry.

The capital goods industry has meanwhile adjusted to a growing market, at least in the medium term. But the big manufacturers in this field are meeting with ever stiffer competition as even medium sized companies in the plant and machinery field supply their machinery with electronic brains.

Germany's biggest supplier i[...] in Augsburg, a subsidiary of [...] werke Karlsruhe. The largest [...] supplier is the Swedish firm [...] the biggest in the world is the A[...] Unimation Inc.

Some 140 makers now share [...] ket in the Western industria[...] with ten per cent of these comp[...] counting for 80 per cent of sales.

Competition is tough and so[...] bitors in Hall 13 admit that they [...] sell below cost.

So anybody who wants to [...] this game needs not only know-[...] above all plenty of cash.

As a result, many small ma[...] disappear from the market be[...] industry becomes a real money [...]

In fact, even large corporation[...] run out of steam, as shown by [...] cent Westinghouse takeover of [...] tion.

The reasons for the use of robo[...] widely. While Japan uses them [...] ly to replace labour according [...] Daimler-Benz head of produc[...] Werner Niefer, Europe is prima[...] terested in more flexibility thro[...] bots.

Fixed welding production lin[...] any rapid adaptation to chang[...] ket conditions impossible. But [...] grammable robots are used, a v[...] models could be manufactured [...] same production line.

While a fixed production lin[...] produce about 1,000 cars a day [...] for itself, the use of robots red[...] number of units needed to 400.

This greatly reduces the risk [...] vesting in a product that cann[...] in the necessary numbers.

So what robots replace is not [...] human labour but an obsolete tech[...] gy: Henry Ford's assembly line.

Anton H[...]
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 11 Ap[...])

■ FINANCE

Bank lending risks: it's a whole new ball game

[D]eutsche Bank has set aside DM1.6bn in its 1982 balance sheet [to] cover bad debts. Dresdner Bank has [set] aside DM850m and Commerzbank [D]M700m.

[T]he amounts are also intended to [cov]er bad debts that have not yet re[vea]led themselves.

[T]hese figures for risk provision are [...]e because bank business, as in all [...]sion years, was good last year. [On]ly a few post-war years can match [...] for bank profits.

[T]he fact that only Deutsche Bank [...]ed its divided (Dresdner's stayed the [...]e and Commerzbank paid nothing) [is] another reason: the risks both at [ho]me and abroad are increasing.

Not enough is known about the fu[...] World recession since 1979 has [tak]en its toll. Companies are going into [ba]nkruptcy and whole nations are feel[ing] the crunch.

Some examples: AEG-Telefunken [av]oided going to the wall only by com[pos]ition proceedings which resulted in [...] paying just 40 pfennigs in the mark [to] creditors.

Countries in financial trouble include [Pol]and and other East Bloc countries; [oil-]importing developing countries; [thr]eshold countries like Brazil and [Arg]entina; and even oil-exporting [cou]ntries like Mexico.

Default by individual borrowers is [no]thing new for banks. What was new [in] 1982 was the large number of them.

The decision the banks made many [ye]ars ago to enter into international bu[sin]ess that no longer serves classical [tra]de financing has lent a new dimen[sion] to bank balance sheets. Ever since [tha]t decision, German banks have been [ex]tending purely financial credit to fo[re]ign countries, government banks and [gov]ernment-owned enterprises.

This has added a new risk to the [m]any risks with which bankers have al[wa]ys had to live (creditworthiness of [a] borrower, fluctuating exchange and [in]terest rates, disparity between the du[rat]ion of contracts under which money [is] borrowed and lent). The new risk [go]es under the name of country risk.

What happened was that bankers [fou]nd themselves unable to answer two [que]stions: would all borrowers abroad [be] able to repay their loans on time? [An]d is the country where the borrower [is] in a position to provide the foreign [ex]change?

The explosiveness of the risk is enor[mou]s, involving as it does governments,

> The explosiveness of the risk is enormous . . . Mexico was a foretaste

[cent]ral banks, the Bank for Internatio[nal] Settlements, the IMF and the World [Ban]k.

A foretaste of this risk was provided [in A]ugust 1982 when Mexico, much to [eve]rybody's surprise, had to ask for a [res]cheduling of its loans.

If the US Administration, the Bank [for] International Settlements and a [nu]mber of central banks had not acted [qui]ckly, the explosion would have [blo]wn the international finance system [to] smithereens.

What was it that years ago prompted [Ger]man bankers to risk venturing into [a] new line of business that is insepa[rab]ly linked with the Euromarkets? [Aft]er all, they were warned at the time [bec]ause Hermann Josef Abs, the then [ch]ief executive of Deutsche Bank, pre[dic]ted the dangers lurking on the Euro[mar]kets.



Euromarkets are the only explanation for the fact that Third World countries were able to get so deep into debt in the first place. The Euromarkets are operated by all institutions engaged in international banking — not only through their national parent companies but also and above all through their branches and subsidiaries in the Euromarketplaces where they benefit from cost advantages.

In these places, such as Luxembourg, London, the New York Free Trade Zone, the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Singapore and Bahrain, the business volume has increased by an average of 25 per cent a year over the pat ten years. And the bank supervision authorities in the home countries of the parent banks knew nothing about it.

Because of the slump at home, many German banks lost their traditional credit customers after 1974. They sought and found new customers in the East Bloc and the Third World.

But many of the East Bloc deals that are worrying them today were not entirely voluntary. The last loans given to Poland — which should never have been granted, as the banks know today — were extended under the pressure of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's gentle but firm persuasion.

But the loans given to oil-importing developing countries were granted without any outside pressures.

The banks used the opportunity the Euromarkets presented after the 1973 oil price shock:

The Opec price hikes played havoc with the current account balances of developing and threshold countries.

Internationally operating banks jumped into the breach with credits. The funding of the loans was made possible through recycled Opec surpluses — and recycling that was much praised at the time.

German banks had no pangs of conscience at the time because there were sound reasons for the financial credits they extended. These loans did not only make profits for the banks but also boosted the economy as a whole.

After all, was it not only reasonable for Germany, an oil-importing nation, to do everything in its power to pay some of the oil bill by boosting exports?

The fact is that the bank loans to developing threshold and East Bloc countries ensured their ability to buy German goods.

But the clear conscience did not last. The introduction of roll-over loans posed problems.

This, too, was described by Abs at the time: normally, a banker will give a loan only if he knows what the money will be used for and where the repayments will come from.

Abs underscored at the time that this was different on Euromarkets. When Euromarket loans fall due, they are repaid with money obtained through new credits. The last borrower gets his credit on a long-term basis but his changing creditors, whose commitment is short-term, roll over the refinancing interest to the borrower.

This eliminates any risk due to changing interest rates for the lending banks because the borrower bears the burden of rising interest rates,

What happened was that, in 1979, the year of the second oil shock, the countries where creditor banks are located embarked on an anti-inflationary course. And since this meant higher interest rates, the high interest was passed on to the borrowers (including all debts) as part of the roll-over procedure.

The borrowers' interest burden thus grew considerably and the rising dollar exchange rate increased their nominal volume of debt.

This sort of development could only have worked without repercussions had there been high growth rates, high world market prices for raw materials and open markets in the industrial world.

But the recession put pressure on world market prices and promoted protectionism in the industrial nations.

The permanent rescheduling candidates (Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Zaire) were joined by such threshold countries as Brazil and even some oil-exporting nations like Mexico, Iran and Nigeria. They were no longer able to service principal and interest repayments on schedule. Rescheduling applications mounted as a result.

This has made country risks an explosive problem for the banks. Now there is talk of more stringent banking supervision even in the United States. In Germany, the Bonn government, the Bank Supervision Authority and the Bundesbank must stand by with liquid funds to bail out banks should they find themselves in trouble.

There are three major questions under discussion today:

- How to limit country risk to manageable proportions.
- How to treat country risks in bank balance sheets.
- How to prevent foreign subsidiaries of German banks from remaining a vulnerable spot for Germany's banking industry because they are not subject to German banking laws and are therefore outside the control of the German Bank Supervision Authority.

The Bonn government, the Bank Supervision Authority and the Bundesbank have kept aloof from the first question. Nobody has been prepared to suggest a quantitative limitation of country risks by restricting the total lending volume to a country.

It was the banks themselves who came up with an answer by adopting the principle that the credit volume may not exceed 18 times the nation's own assets.

The parent banks have always abided by this principle while their subsidiaries have not.

The lack of market clarity has prevented risks beings reduced in time. The banks were unaware that their international competitors throughout the world acted by the same principle and that "this led to a dangerous accumulation of balance of payments credits given to the same country by various banks." (Head of the Bank Supervision Authority, Inge Lore Bähre).

Germany is also rather liberal in the handling of country risks in balance sheets. America and Britain would like to see the Bonn government press the banks to arrive at a uniform method of balance sheet adjustments for accounts receivable from abroad.

The prevailing view in Britain and America is that adjustments are unnecessary if rescheduling operations are assisted by the IMF, which would indicate the likelihood that a country will get back on its feet.

In Germany, there are no prescribed minimum quotas for balance sheet adjustments. The amount is decided by the board, which acts in its own right though sometimes urged by the Bundesbank and the Bank Supervision Authority.

Manfred Meier-Preschany, Dresdner Bank board member in charge of foreign business: "It would be wrong to lump all countries together. For some countries, rescheduling operations are not enough. They have to have the durations of the rescheduled loans extended."

As a result, adjustments in the balance sheet depend on each individual case and on the bank's ability to make an adjustment, i.e. its profits.

For example, balance sheet analysts say that Deutsche Bank has made a full adjustment for its Polish credits in 1982 by allowing DM500m for emergencies.

The third question as to making foreign subsidiaries subject to German banking laws is about to be settled through EEC regulations.

Community guidelines that would make the foreign subsidiaries subject to the parent company's national banking laws have already been drafted and are ready for adoption.

> Now there is talk of even more stringent banking supervision, even in the USA

As a result, German banking laws should include the obligation for banks to present the Bank Supervision Authority with consolidated balance sheets that would make it possible to check whether parent and subsidiaries combined have exceeded the permissible credit volume which is based on a bank's own capital.

Since the necessary amendment of the Banking Act has been put aside by the Bonn government due to pressing other business, the Bank Supervision Authority depends on a gentlemen's agreement.

Under the agreement, 31 banks have volunteered to permit some such checks. This was a tough decision for many of them because it means that they either have to reduce their volume of business to stay within the limits set by their own capital or have to seek new capital.

But what is a chief bank executive to do when he is unable to raise new capital at a particular time? This has prompted Wolfgang Seipp, chief executive of Commerzbank, to ask whether it is not incompatible with the board's duties under company law voluntarily to enter into a gentlemen's agreement that could have a negative effect on earnings.

Who knows whether German bankers would have ventured into international business had they know the dangers that lay ahead?

Rudolf Herlt
(Die Zeit, 15 April 1983)

■ PERSPECTIVE

Time for Europe to stand back and look at itself

This article was written by Munich political scientist Professor Paul Noack.

The time is ripe for the European Community to take another look at peace and security problems, says a joint report by the heads of the five major European research institutes on international affairs.

It should make a greater contribution to security policy, both at the political level and at the operational level.

Military self-reliance and a decoupling from the United States is ruled out if for no other reason than cost: defence spending would rise to domestically unacceptable levels.

The Federal Republic of Germany was represented by the research unit of the Foreign Affairs Association.

The wide-ranging report goes into what is likely to be lost if the pressure of protectionism breaks down the core of the European Community, the Common Market.

It also says that the European Monetary System should be treated as one of the key means of controlling the current ecomonic crisis instead of being regarded merely as a part of European integration.

And it says that jargon in the EEC institutions has in a few years reached a peak of incomprehensibility.

Europe is in a flat spin, say the authors, and the only way to cope is to be prepared to apply the opposite lock, not to keep cool, calm and detached.

They have joined forces in sounding a note of alarm.

"Profound unrest and urgent anxiety prompt this report" are the opening words:

"If nothing is done we will face the disintegration of the most important European achievements since the end of the Second World War."

These words were written even before the experts could have known that alienation was in the offing between Bonn and Paris.

What they at present still diagnose as a tragedy could well turn out to be something even worse, with European countries having no-one to blame but themselves.

Thirty years after the Second World finally deprived them of their status as the centre of the civilised world they face the prospect of total eclipse.

The report, dramatically entitled Progress or Decline: The EEC's Decision, cannot be expected to herald a change. Bad habits are too deeply ingrained.

After all, not even direct elections to the European Assembly in 1980 succeeded in making Europe more familiar to the Europeans.

Should there be growing lack of interest next time round, in 1984, meaning an even poorer turnout, it will merely provide a further alibi for national egoism.

In effect, egoism of this kind fritters away both the individual and the common benefit that might otherwise be derived.

It is thus much to the authors' credit that they refrain from flogging the dead horse of European ideology; it is an ideology no-one is interested in hearing more about.

They make no appeal to idealism of whatever kind. They merely list everything that runs the risk of being forfeited if the core of the European Community, the Common Market, breaks down under pressure from protectionism.

These likely losses include the following:

- the trade-promoting effect of the EEC customs union;
- the quantitative advantage that has led to growing specialisation and competitiveness in the world market;
- the increasing efficiency in sectors previously protected;
- the alleviation of the effect of de facto national monopolies and the availability of a larger supply of goods at lower prices (always excluding the agricultural market);
- and the advantages of increasing direct investment within member-countries.

The authors suggest that change is possible within the framework of existing structures.

They are well aware that it would be irresponsible to wait for a fundamental restructuring of the mechanisms of European integration.

That, after all, would be no more than an attempt to avoid what would then soon be inevitable.

The authors thus support the status quo. They feel existing structures are worth protecting.

Their assessment of world affairs is also conservative.

Deterrence, for example, is felt to be the only way of keeping the peace. President Reagan's versions of the future are not given a mention.

If anything, even fiercer competition between the blocs is expected. Tension is not expected to relax.

Ties with the United States, with all the contradictions they entail, are projected into the decades ahead. Europe is not even as much as considered as being on a par with the superpowers.

Sometimes the report is a little contrite, as when all that is said about the detente policy of the 1970s is that Western Europe fell foul of its own hopes and wishful thinking in respect of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

It would have been better if more realistic options in the early-1970s had been outlined, even though at present the assessment of detente, whatever it may have meant to individual countries, has emerged as the main bone of contention with the United States.

The term "conservative" is not intended to imply backward in any way. There is little point in analysing the world as it might be rather than as it is.

That is why this implicitly conservative outlook has its advantages, and its finer points come to light when it is a matter of framing proposals.

They range from reciprocal recognition of academic qualifications to extending the term of office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The authors are sceptical about fundamental changes in European structures, and that is what makes their point that nothing new is needed carry conviction.

It would, they argue, be enough for the European Community countries to recall the joint and successful principles of the EEC's early years.

One of their major demands is for the European Monetary System no longer to be understood merely as part and parcel of European integration.

It must, they say, be treated as what it really is, one of the key means of controlling the current economic crisis.

A greater Europeanisation of major industries is considered necessary to ensure competitiveness on a world scale.

The authors are not alone in wondering why cooperation between European and, say, American firms ought in the long run to be any easier than cooperation between companies in member-countries of the European Community.

The fact of course remains that politicians could not behave toward the EEC in the way they do if effective ties with community institutions had been established over the past 20 years.

But they haven't and the media for one are reminded of their responsibility:

"The portrayal of Community processes in the national media and public opinion is fatal for any development of common interest or prospect of compromise.

"Individual Ministers are made out merely to be national champions sent into the ring to take arms against obdurate opponents and poorly-drafted proposals."

It is gratifying to note that it is also made clear that Community institutions themselves have failed to establish a place in European hearts:

"Community jurgon has in a few years reached a peak of incomprehensibility for which centuries have been necessary in some countries."

Despite the multi-dimensional character of the attribution of guilt this capuchin homily is centred on an aspect that is usually ignored when the situation in Europe is at issue.

It is the security policy sector. Security is given a modern definition in that economic security is felt to be just as important as military security.

The overriding background fact is stated as follows: "Of all major trading partners only Japan is more dependent than the Community is on the international exchange of goods and services."

This is one of the causes of tension in relations with the United States, which has priorities other than those of North-South ties.

Although the European Community is an economic community, albeit an incomplete one, disputes with both the United States and the Soviet Union occur mainly, if not exclusively, in the security policy sector.

This leads to the basic tenet of the entire report, which reads as follows:

"We are of the view that for the European Community the time is ripe for a reappraisal of peace and security problems.

"The Community must gain clarity about what is at stake and evolve appropriate new responsibilities in view of European unions and institutions within the framework of shared Western viewpoints."

This, as it were, is the only aspect on which a departure is made from the considered status quo approach.

It is lent added weight by the fact that the European Community, in the wake of southward expansion (which the authors advocate), is in the process of becoming virtually identical with the European part of Nato.

In two sequences of thought the need for an explicitly European security policy is discussed.

The first is based on the fact that ideas of decoupling are ga[...] strength in the United Sta[...] basic feeling exists. There ca[...] little doubt that any such de[...] would be to the detriment o[...] American interests and might [...] to a gigantic displacement of th[...] balance of power to the disadv[...] the United States (and, natur[...] Europe as the victim).

"History shows that nations [...] ble of committing dreadfully [...] dered acts, and why should th[...] States be immune to a repetitio[...] takes others have made before[...]"

The conclusion reached is [...] bly enough, that we can and [...] militarily self-reliant without th[...] States.

That, it is argued, is out of th[...] tion because, if for no other [...] would entail an increase in [...] spending that was domestical[...] sible.

The authors also set aside an[...] a resurrection of the European [...] Community.

But Europe must, they say, [...] greater contribution toward [...] policy both at the political leve[...] the operational sector.

That is the only way in whic[...] hold its own in critical situatio[...] crisis zones.

The experts likewise keep th[...] firmly on the ground when it c[...] Europe's nuclear contribution. [...] not go out of their depth on [...] nuclear forces and the like.

What they propose and consi[...] sible in the foreseeable future [...] sultations in which Britain and [...] can include their European pa[...] target planning, as they alrea[...] Nato's Nuclear Planning Grou[...]

What the report has to say i[...] not least, conservative in ya[...] mainly positive sense of the ter[...]

The authors want nothing m[...] call on the governments of Eu[...] recall the almost forgotten re[...] on which European integra[...] based."

But that alone will be of littl[...] cause governments usually fai[...] the time in which to read paper[...] kind.

And even if they do find ti[...] will not find time in which to c[...] their electorates of the need fo[...] forms outlined.

It is always easier to go in fo[...] nal self-righteousness and to [...] blame at the others' door.

Offering advice in politics ha[...] been a thankless task, especi[...] matters of world affairs, and wi[...] nue to be so.

That is why it so important fo[...] to resume the discussion of Eu[...] problems. It is the only way in [...] European paralysis can be ov[...] after having descended on such [...] public.


This paralysis can be blamed [...] the governments, Community [...] tions and organs of public opini[...] the main reason why such Eu[...] stupidities occur that we are da[...] ing to view as the normal stat[...] fairs.

Specialist in outlook though [...] what has been reviewed may s[...] very telling comparison was dr[...] respect of one state of affairs.

"In the Community," the repor[...] "what happens is much the sam[...] an old Spanish inn. The quality [...] meal dpends on what the guests [...] pared to contribute toward the c[...] repast."

Paul N[...]

(Deutsches Allgemeines So[...] 17 Ap[...])



TRANSPORT

Plans to go ahead with lead-free fuel trial

[M]unich and West Berlin are about to go ahead with experimental [...]-free petrol projects.

[I]n Munich, the plan will involve local [auth]ority vehicles. The city is buying [fro]m German manufacturers about 40 [vehi]cles made for export to the United [Stat]es and Japan, which both have lead-[free] fuel.

[I]n West Berlin, the city is trying a si[mila]r experiment in conjunction with [AD]AC, a motorists' organisation based [in M]unich.

Lead is used to boost the octane rat[ing] in petrol. But it has long been sus[pect]ed of affecting the intelligence of [chil]dren and causing behaviourial prob[lem]s.

The British government has just ac[cep]ted a Royal Commission report that [it] should be phased out of petrol.

Munich, which has taken the lead in [the] country, is the cleanest of the West [Ger]man cities, according to the Federal [Hea]lth agency.

It has converted most of its coal- and [oil]-fired heating installations into the [cle]aner natural gas and piped heating.

But at street level, the air Munich [peo]ple breathe is no cleaner than any[whe]re else.

[R]üdiger Schweikl, municipal envi[ron]mental affairs officer, estimates that [car]s in Munich put out an annual [...]9,000 tonnes of carbon monoxide, 254,000 tonnes of nitrous oxides and 14,000 tonnes of urburnt hydrocarbons.

In Germany as a whole motor vehicles are estimated to account for about 60 per cent of the carbon monoxide output, 50 per cent of the hydrocarbon output and 35 per cent of the nitrous oxide output.

The motor-car is to blame for more than 90 per cent of atmospheric pollution in the streets of German cities.


A brochure on motoring and the environment published by the Environmental Protection Agency, West Berlin, paints a grim picture of the effects of carbon monoxide.

It is said to block oxygen intake into the blood thereby leading to a shortage of oxygen in the body tissue.

This can cause headaches, giddiness, sickness, buzzing in the ears, difficulty in breathing, unconsciousness and even death.

Sufferers from cardiac and circulatory complaints in particular are in danger when pollution peaks during the rush hour or smog.

A point not made in the brochure but now considered to be an established fact is that sulphur dioxide is not alone in being to blamo for tree deaths; nitrous oxides from car exhausts also contribute.



Battery bus

Düsseldorf's transport authority is experimenting with this new battery powered bus. It uses a roof-top collector similar to the old trolley bus arm to recharge at the terminus. (Photo: dpa)

Cities and conurbations have invested heavily in public transport and traffic schemes such as pedestrian precincts, one-way systems and linked traffic lights to keep to a minimum the harmful effects of car exhausts on residents.

Herr Schweikl dismisses all these schemes as largely ineffective. He plans to strike at the root cause of the trouble.

Munich, if the plans Burgomaster Kiesl has already approved are endorsed by the city council, will be the first city in the Federal Republic of Germany in which motorists will have to use lead-free fuel.

Environmental protection at the fountainhead is how Herr Kiesl views the proposal. He is convinced it will reduce by about 90 per cent the count of a variety of toxins in car exhaust fumes. The lead count will naturally be reduced to zero.

In both the USA and Japan motor fuel has been lead-free since 1975, and only in combination with lead-free fuel can a special catalyst and the lambda probe be used to virtually eliminate harmful exhaust fumes.

More expensive

Buying suitable vehicles was the least of Herr Schweikl's problems. A tougher one was ensuring supplies of lead-free fuel throughout the trial period.

He was referred by the Environmental Protection Agency to Aral's Gelsenkirchen refinery, where limited quantities of lead-free fuel have been produced for some time to meet the requirements of German motor manufacturers.

The special fuel will be available at a municipal garage where private motorists may later be entitled to fill up.

Initially, Munich will have to invest extra cash in the experiment. Cars made to comply with US and Japanese regulations cost about 15 per cent more than conventional models.

And they need to be reconverted to meet a number of domestic requirements.

The lead-free fuel itself it will be about 10 pfennigs a litre more expensive than conventional fuel, while the special cars' fuel consumption will be a little higher than average.

But Herr Schweikl is convinced the extra expense will not be too much. The special cars will dispense with metallic finishes (a saving of roughly DM1,000 a time, he says) and other extras.

The life-span of their exhausts should be twice that of conventional vehicles'. Spark plugs should need replacing less often too. So running costs seem sure to be lower.

Three years ago Herr Schweikl was Press spokesman at the Bavarian Environmental Affairs Ministry and a keen campaigner for clean car exhausts.

In those days the city's present experiment would have been unthinkable. Motor manufacturers took a dim view of such demands.

They argued that German engines relied on leaded fuel, whereas no comparison could be drawn with models designed for export to the United States and Japan.

Besides, what were needed were cars that used less fuel. Herr Schweikl's colleagues at the Ministry were by no means alone in being convinced that lead-free fuel was an unlikely prospect.

Oddly enough, it was a German motor manufacturer who gave him the cue for resurrecting the plans. Lead-free fuel, a BMW spokesman said, was no longer a problem for German engines.

"Technically," says Dietmar Domröse of the Munich motor manufacturers, "cars could be converted quickly."

Herr Schweikl now plans to take the industry at its word and launch a long-term experiment. The motor industry is not unhappy to fall in with his plans either.

They are a convenient opportunity of slipping out of the line of fire in which power utilities find themselves in connection with the tree death debate.

"Now," says Herr Domröse cheerfully, "the ball is in the oil industry's court." Oil refineries have argued in the past that manufacturers were not yet ready for lead-free fuel.

The ball is also in Bonn Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann's court. He is shortly due to confer with the Interior Ministers of the *Länder* and, a few days later, with motor and oil industry managers on ways and means of changing over to unleaded fuel.

Bonn is still working on the assumption that there will need to be a European solution, or an arrangement covering the entire Common Market.

Herr Schweikl is sceptical. He has a feeling it will be all words and no action.

Christian Schneider

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 April 1983)

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

Waste recycling sits in a great dump of problems

Waste recycling is not the universal environmental cure-all it was once thought.

There were once great hopes of saving energy and raw materials, of economising and preventing environmental damage, but they have given way to a more sceptical view.

Professor Alfons Buekens of Brussels University told a conference at the Protestant Church Academy in Locoum, near Hanover, he knew of not a single really satisfactory recycling facility.

None worked in accordance with the requirements of modern environmental legislation and ran at a profit at the same time.

The conversion of techniques and combinations of processes that seemed sensible in theory into practical arrangements that worked had proved more difficult than expected.

The differences in composition of domestic waste supplied presented problems time and again, while the material recycled did not sell well.

Attempts to solve secondary and tertiary environmental problems had everywhere led to unexpectedly heavy expenditure.

Installations built so far in the Federal Republic of Germany are no exception; they have failed so far to fulfill the hopes placed in them.

The recycling plant in Neuss, near Düsseldorf, works only by being attached to a waste dump, and only a small proportion of the waste is actually recycled.

The Ruhr recycling centre, designed to handle 425,000 tonnes of domestic and industrial waste a year, is admitted by its manager, Wolf-Dieter Sondermann, to be in effect little more than an incinerator.

Banking on centralisation and high technology, he says, has led to capital investment and annual follow-up costs that impose a heavy burden on the taxpayer.

They also have the effect of blocking other means of treating waste of years.

Experts likewise claim the Tübingen pilot project, which is heavily subsidised by the Bonn government, doesn't work despite having cost a fortune.

Maybe it was the spirit of the Loccum Academy that prompted speakers to be so frank and outspoken.

Over 150 people attended the conference on recycling and problems of processing (and opportunities of reducing or avoiding) domestic waste.

They were members of civic protest groups, industrial representatives, waste processers and local government officials.

Thilo Koch of the Heidelberg Institute of Energy and Environmental Research said the 1980s and 1990s could herald a rethink on integrated treatment of waste.

All waste channels might be brought together for central disposal or processing. But the rethink could possibly result in a differential approach.

The change-over might be to separation of the individual components of domestic waste and to separate recycling. But would it happen?

Pilot projects involving separate collection of categories of waste are certainly being given greater attention.

One, in Konstanz, is being carried out by Dornier, a private company interested in refuse disposal. Another, in a Frankfurt suburb, is being undertaken by the local authority refuse collection department.

The aim behind separate collection is to persuade householders to sort waste and put different categories in different dustbins.

In Frankfurt paper and glass are being collected separately in this way. Elsewhere it is hoped to collect plastic, metal, textiles and organic waste separately.

Contrary to what many experts were expecting, householders are cooperating. Motivated by environmental awareness, they are going to the trouble of putting separate waste in separate bins.

In this way the volume of unsorted domestic garbage can be cut by at least 30 per cent, it is now generally estimated.

But such experiments did not attempt to deal with the root cause, an environmentalist reminded the conference; they merely tinkered with the symptoms.

The packaging industry and food retailers came under fire for forcing more and more packaging on the consumer. It made up roughly half the volume of domestic waste, said Jürgen Orlich of the Environmental Protection Agency.

He singled out cans of soft drink as an example of the disparity between content and packaging.

The can cost roughly 25 pfennigs, the contents (sugar, water and aromatic agents) five pfennigs at most. So consumers paid mainly for the packaging.

Reusable bottles (the ones with a deposit on them) still account for about 75 per cent of the trade, but there is a marked trend toward the non-returnable variety.

Herr Orlich said the market was on the brink of having to decide for one system or the other. At some point between 75 and 50 per cent it was no longer profitable to supply both reusable and disposable packaging.

The result would probably be a drastic increase in the number of waste bottles and cans. Separating them from other categories of domestic waste was only one solution.

Another would be to insist on reusable bottles that were returned to the manufacturer, and priority ought surely to be given to preventing waste, with recycling being a secondary consideration.

A conference working party drew up a combined programme of waste prevention and recycling against the background of a harmonious understanding of man and nature and of the finite nature of resources.

It called for a ban on the manufacture of substances that were harmful to the environment (or for the use of 'closed' systems), for compulsory declaration of contents and for differential waste disposal levies (a packaging tax).

Local authorities were called on to collect various categories of waste separately, including organic kitchen waste, and to recycle them.

Consumers were to avoid superfluous packaging, boycotting manufacturers if need be, and to make greater use of fresh goods.

Helmut Hildebrandt

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 April 1983)

Bonn to cla[mp] down on poison dispo[sal]

The Bonn Interior Mi[nistry has] drafted a Bill to provide fo[r] controls of dangerous wast[e] through the Federal Republic [of Ger]many.

The step is in response to the [...] surrounding 41 missing drum[s ...] waste from Seveso in northern [...]

Günter Hartkopf, state sec[retary at] the Interior Ministry, says an [amend]ment to the 1972 Waste Dispos[al Act would] provide for transit permit proc[...] mainly needed because the GD[R ...] a special waste dump two year[s ...] Schönberg, about nine miles fr[om Lü]beck.

Transit of special waste ha[s as]sumed any importance for the [Federal] Republic since the establishme[nt of the] Schönberg dump.

The Bill works on the ass[umption] that toxic waste ought to be di[sposed of] in the country of origin, Dr H[artkopf] says.

Anyone who wants to send [...] waste through the Federal Rep[ublic will] in future require a permit [...] every *Land*, or Federal state, [through] which the shipment passes.

Permits would only be issued [...] to restrictions. They need no[t, for in]stance, be issued if environme[ntal pol]lution is likely to occur in the [Federal] Republic as a result of unsa[...] waste disposal in a neighbou[ring coun]try.

Shipments of toxic waste w[ould no] longer be allowed to cross th[e border] into Germany at any crossing [...] to be restricted to crossings nea[r ...]tories where substances can b[...]ed.

The Bill would entitle the [...] vernment to stipulate by decre[e ...] border crossing points were to [...]

The *Länder*, Dr Hartkopf say[s ...] favour of intensifying the prov[isions of] the Waste Disposal Act as prop[osed by] his Ministry.

The Interior Minister would [be em]powered to intervene in perm[it proce]dures for international shipm[ents of] particularly dangerous substan[ces.]

In cases where overriding [...] considerations were involved h[e would] be entitled to issue instruction[s to] local authorities.

Gerda S[...]

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 A[pril 1983])

Schreckenberger

Continued from page 4

lems in a broad light, he needs the streamlining of government work provided by Schreckenberger. This does not only apply to day-to-day business but also to political and economic fundamentals.

Though it is difficult to "programme an industrial society" and to project our basic order into economics, "the market needs overall political measures by the government to remain stable."

When it come to drafting long-term plans at the Chancellery there are bound to be conflicts between Schreckenberger and the Chancellor, who is not exactly a specialist on economics.

Schreckenberger says that "a professor can say more than a normal politician," but it is doubtful whether the Chancellor will put up with persistent contradiction — even from one of his most loyal friends.

It is, however, certain that any conflict that might arise will not be publicly aired by Schreckenberger.

Those who know him believe that if any dispute became too great, he would simply pack his bags and return to academic life.

(Wirtschaftswoche, 8 April 1983)

Continued from page 5

cess. Sales of the imported models (the Jetta, the Passat/Santana, the Scirocco and the VW bus) were up nearly a third in the first quarter of this year.

Yet the Santana, for instance, is competing with the much roomier Cadillac, and a Santana turbo diesel costs nearly $4,000 more than a fully-fledged Cadillac.

Among imported models the strategy of withdrawing to parts of the market where price war is not being waged seems to work.

But Volkswagen of America aim to corner five per cent of the US market by the mid-1980s, and that calls for more than a retreat to market nooks and crannies.

What, for that matter, is to become of the Rabbit, which as recently as two years ago looked capable of cornering an entire warren?

Is there a nook big enough for an annual output of 230,000 cars? Competition is sure to grow even fiercer. US production of the Honda Accord is soon to go into full swing.

At the end of next year Toyota and GM plan to start manufacturing a competitor to the Rabbit in California. An extra 200,000 compacts a year will then crowd an already overcrowded market.

In dollars and cents the Rabbit cannot hold its own. The price was cut by $625 last year without boosting sales. The Japanese are in a much healthier position because they would still be making a profit if they slashed prices by 20 per cent.

Not so Volkswagen. A US Senate committee estimates that the company is losing $800 on every car it makes in the United States.

On every car VW imports, in contrast, it is said to earn $2,000, and these figures have yet to be disproved.

At VW's head office in W[olfsburg] executives say the company l[ost] DM1bn in the United States [since the] Westmoreland works were open[ed.]

Yet Peter Weiher insists VW [was] right to set up a production fa[cility in] the United States:

"Had it not been for Westm[oreland] we would not have been able t[o com]pete during the compact boo[m. We] would not have been able to hol[d on to] our dealers and would have lost a [...] greater share of the market."

But he also admits that while th[e dol]lar is trading at about DM2.40 th[e Rab]bit could be manufactured for [less in] Germany.

Even so, he rules out closur[e: "We] are never going to close our prod[uction] base, not even if the figures g[et] worse."

Peter C[...]

(Die Zeit, 22 A[pril 1983])

■ THE CINEMA

Schumann film brings two worlds together

[F]ilms about musicians may be popular with cinemagoers. But they tend [not] to be among serious music-lovers.

[H]ow often have we seen poor, long-[suf]fering Chopin on the screen! There [hav]e also been films without number [abo]ut Schubert, while Mozart's life has [eve]n been serialised on TV.

[T]he silver screen has even staked its [clai]m on the life of Beethoven. Fritz [Kort]ner starred as Beethoven back in [the] days of silent movies.

[M]athias Wiemann in *Träumerei* play[ed] Schumann several decades ago. [Com]posers' life stories are evidently felt [to] be good screen material.

[T]he genius whose tale is told is al[wa]ys a world-famous figure whose life [stor]y is a fact. It can be told as it is [kn]own to have been; no further proof is [ne]eded.

All that is left to do to provide an ef[fec]tive screen contrast is to underscore [the] difference between the pleasure and [joy]s of creativity and the trials and tri[bu]lations of everyday life, the hunger [an]d the ups and downs of the genius.

His music is so heaven-sent; his ever[yda]y life so brings one down to earth. [Scr]eenplay-writers have wrung every [las]t ounce of appeal out of this heart[bre]aking contrast.

Films about musicians are often a [bo]x-office success, but they are also in[evit]ably a doubtful quantity.

Frühlingssinfonie (Spring Symphony), directed by Peter Schumoni, is the [lat]est. It deals with Robert Schumann, [wh]om Nietzsche so mistakenly called [the] Sweet Saxon.

It gets off to a furious start. Russian [vio]linist Gidon Kremer in the guise of [Pag]anini plays one of his wild capric[cio]s to a Biedermeier audience.

It is a breathtaking performance, and in the audience we see the young Schumann, played by Herbert Grönemeyer, with a frank and open expression.

He is carried away by the fast and furious rhythms and decides there and then to become the Paganini of the piano.

Schamoni selects 10 heaven-sent, sad years of the composer's life. He sets out to learn the ropes from Friedrich Wieck, the hard-nosed businessman father of infant prodigy Clara Wieck.

But he has to give up any idea of becoming a pianist. A hand injury rules out a career at the keys. So he goes in for composing instead.

He falls in love with Wieck's gifted daughter, but her pigheaded father wants at any cost to end their liaison. They eventually go to court to get married.

Her father, who has invested all his live in his superb pianist daughter, loses the case and the young couple are finally able to marry.

But the happy end is clouded. Schamoni hints that something is bound to go wrong. Two geniuses cannot possibly get on with each other.

A human tragedy is clearly in the offing. The film ends on a distinctly subdued note.

It is yet another film that relies on scraps of music by an acknowledged genius. These popular items are visually underlined by Saxon Biedermeier period pieces.

The storyline is a tale of flight and separation, of heartbreak and revolt, of cruelty on the part of an unbending father, of young love and its disconsolate fight for the cause.

Schamoni keeps to the known facts. In precise detail he outlines the narrow confines of Schumann's Saxon surroundings.

At times he seems over-fussy in the exact directions he gives to his young cast. But much of the film is fine, emotive and carries conviction.



Nastassja Kinski and Rolf Hoppe as daughter and father Wieck in 'Frühlingssinfonie.' (Photo: Warner-Columbia)

Other scenes are less successful. They include the one in which the young Mendelssohn, played by André Heller, is introduced.

Heller plays the part as that of an angry young man. In the process he narrowly avoids transforming the entire film into pure farce.

Nastassja Kinski is strangely rigid and somewhat unromantic as Clara Wieck. She only succeeds at times in credibly playing the part of a childlike genius at the piano.

But she does make the tragedy and buffeting suffered by Clara comprehensible.

Rolf Hoppe, the amazing character actor from Dresden, clearly commands the stage as Robert Wieck, the cruel and unbending father.

In *Mephisto* Hoppe emerged from a minor role to virtually dominate the action. In *Frühlingssinfonie* he is likewise a key figure, even though he is deserted and alone at the end.

He imbues his difficult part with a decided note of tragedy, combining doting yet calculating paternal love with a dash of evil genius.

He also incorporates a suggestion of sinfully interesting love between father and daughter.

It adds a constant dash of excitement, coupled with revulsion at times, yet remains both dubious and fascinating, just as Hoppe ends by making the film his own.

He dispenses with all the obvious cliches and plays his part in a way that cannot be seen without periodic gooseflesh.

Cameraman Gerard Vandenberg contributes what at times are superb pictures of a fragile, almost Philistine yet very much alive Biedermeier.

He is a highly musical person, which is often a great help in the context. His nostalgically gloomy or brightly-lit images time and again dig deep into the 19th century.

As a result Schamoni's film is more than mere honest workmanship based on the well-known lives of famous musicians. There is more to it than to others of its genre.

It is worth seeing, even for music-lovers and connoisseurs of Schumann.

Friedrich Luft

(Die Welt, 16 April 1983)

Old discarded Bogart take gives Germans a lesson in editing

One take of the Bogart film *Casablanca* was not included in the [fina]l version, although it was Bogart's [fav]ourite scene.

But the "only forgotten take of Casa[bla]nca" was shown at the end of the [Ob]erhausen film festival.

Casablanca created a legend, which [is m]ore than can be said for most short [film]s entered by West German filmma[kers] at Oberhausen.

What they seem to have forgotten is [the a]rt of cutting. German entries were [too] long and boring.

It was a pity, since they dealt with ur[gent] problems of the age: arms, peace, [hum]an rights and xenophobia.

Cartoon films and animation effects [seem] to be rare. Only Franz Winzent[sen']s *Flamingo* enlivened the monotony [of] Oberhausen.

It features technically varied sketches [fro]m his animation diary, entries only [seem]ingly arranged in meaningless [ord]er.

Experimental film entries failed to [brin]g much to light either, always ex[cep]ting Christine Markgraf's *Täglich [bin] ich aufgewacht* and Werner Nekes' *[Bli]ck aus dem harmonischen Gefäng[nis].*

Both films are of above-average artis[tic] substance. Hers features people in [var]ious cities that merge into a fictitious city of shadows as the daylight slowly changes.



Rigid communication rituals . . . 'Blick aus dem harmonischen Gefängnis.' (Photo: © Werner Nekes)

Nekes, who at 40 is almost a grand old man of a predominantly youthful genre, features half-naked young people in rigid communication rituals dancing though the gates.

It is a work of technical perfection and exciting aestheticism he has submitted to the North Rhine-Westphalian Film Bureau.

In the quest for a new subjectivity a number of documentary filmmakers entered striking material. It included Michael Lentz' *Verländert.*

It tells the tale of a young Turkish woman and the problems she has with emancipation and integration.

She fails to live up to the expectations placed in her either at home or at work, where her instructor sounds a note of resignation.

Too much is expected of her. That is why This film for once was too short; it only hints at the many difficulties that arise.

Two other very personal films carried conviction at Oberhausen. They were Kirsten Jepsen's *Kaiser, König, Bettelmann*, the sensitively-told tale of a Berlin street, and *Eigentlich lebe ich ganz normal*, made by Bochum trio Hartmut

Continued on page 14



■ CONFERENCES

European, Arab, scholars, diplomats meet for exchange of ideas




Delegates from 30 European and Arab nations met for five days of talks in Hamburg this month under the auspices of the German Oriental Institute.

It was an attempt to revive the dialogue between Europeans and Arabs that began 10 years ago. But it had limited success.

It took only until the second day before all the prejudices came out. But it was ill-fated from the beginning.

The assassination in Portugal of Issam Sartawi, a leading moderate member of the PLO, and the failure of the bid to involve Jordan in the Middle East peace process dominated the talks.

It was a domination at the expense of themes involving European-Arab cultural coexistence.



Hitting the high note: Egyptian singer Leila Fares shows delegates a cultural thing or two. (Photo: Ulrike Scherwinski)

No speakers succeeded in suggesting practical ideas for the protection of common cultural values.

The Arab cultural experts as usual zeroed in on Israel, accusing it of dismantling Islamic and Christian cultural values.

The Europeans had nothing with which to counter Arab mistrust towards them. In fact they almost beat their breasts in an attempt to pin the blame for the Middle East dilemma on themselves. On the first day, Helga Schuchardt, Hamburg's senator for cultural affairs, convincingly advocated the preservation of Islamic and Third World identity. But when talking with Arabs and Germans she had no answer to the question as to why the Germans were unable to accept the idea of Moslems keeping their identity in Germany instead of surrendering it. She had little option but to admit to ingrained prejudices.


The following day, Edward Mortimer of the London *Times* went a step further and accused the West of not having rid itself of its guilt complex towards the Jews, of having ignored the Palestinian problem until the 1967 Israeli-Egyptian War and of having been indifferent to the occupation of Arab territories.

He said that interest in the Arab world was purely economically motivated and that it did not arise until the 1973 oil shock endangered affluence at home. Discussions on the periphery of the meeting showed that there were fewer mutual complexes and accusations. They also showed that many questions remain open, among them: Why are neither the West Europeans nor the Americans prepared to let the PLO take part in deciding about the future of the Palestinians? Why do the people of Western countries believe that the Arabs want to get rich at the expense of the industrial nations and that they are constantly threatening to use the oil weapon?

Why does the West equate the Islamic religion with the terror in Iran? Do the Europeans really only want Arab oil and money and do Arab problems really only bore them?

A lot of innocent people will die in the Middle East before another attempt to promote a European-Arab dialogue can be made. Unless the West succeeds in coordinating its Middle East policy to make it acceptable for both Israelis and Arabs, and unless the Arabs rid themselves of their mistrust of Western Europe and the USA in respect of the peace process, the European-Arab dialogue will be buried before it has borne its first fruits. The burial did not take place in Hamburg, primarily because there was no shortage of goodwill, despite all the criticism.

Baha Güngör
(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 13 April 1983)



Multiplying Moslems

Islam is the second religion, numerically speaking, i[n Germa]ny after Christianity. Moslems include about 1.4 mil[lion] ... 120,000 Yugoslavs, 80,000 Arabs, 20,000 Iranians a[nd] 1,500 German converts. Pictured is a mosque in M... (Photo: ...)

States take steps to introduce Islamic religious lessons

Several *Länder* are taking steps towards introducing Islamic religious instruction for the country's 400,000 Moslem children.

The lead is being taken in North-Rhine Westphalia where a one-year experiment involving 19 Turkish teachers has been completed.

Dr Klaus Gebauer heads a small team involved in developing the *Land* curriculum. He says the aims of Moslem education are to:

- Make Moslem children born in Germany aware of Islamic tradition
- Provide guidelines through this tradition
- Help an Islamic identity to develop in a non-Islamic world
- Promote good relations between Turks and Germans, Mos[lems and] Christians.

Lower Saxony's Education [Minister] Georg-Berndt Oschatz (CDU) [is con]vinced that the Constitution m[akes this] type of instruction mandatory [in] Christian schools.

The constitutionally guarant[eed reli]gious instruction at school mus[t be in]terpreted as relating not only [to Chris]tianity, Oschatz argues.

The North Rhine-Westphalia[n Edu]cation Minister, Jürgen Gi[rgensohn] (SPD), and Berlin Education [Senator] Hanna-Renate Laurien (CDU) ...

Karl-Heinz Walter of North [Rhine-]Westphalia's Education Minist[ry says] that following the year's trial ... state, guidelines will be issued ... mentary schools for the 1983/8[4 school] year.

Dr Gebauer says it was not ... familiarise Turkish teachers ... today's approach to religious [instruc]tion at German schools.

"What the Turkish teachers ... most difficult was to establish ... between actual experience in ... the religious principles of the Ko[ran]."


The Christian churches are ... the North-Rhine Westphalia[n experi]ment with interest. They do not ... pate problems about the teaching [of Is]lamic ideas in itself.

But they are concerned about ... ture of Christian inter-denomi[national] schools where both Islamic and ... tian principles are taught side by [side].

The response of Turkish p[arents] whose children attended the exp[erimen]tal instruction was positive.

One religious leader said: "Wi[th this] religious instruction we could p[erhaps] cut down on or even abolish ins[truction] at Koran schools."

Klaus He...
(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 10 April 1983)



Little Moslems learning from the Koran at the Islamic Centre in Cologne. (Photo: Sven Simon)

■ HEALTH

Drugs and alcohol together 'a startling combination'



When alcohol and drugs are taken together, the results can be start[ling,] a meeting on road safety has been [told].

Professor Hans-Joachim Wagner, of [Saar]land University's forensic medicine [de]partment, said that the main feature [of] the combination was that they heigh[tened] the effect of one another.

His research figures indicated that [roa]d accidents were three and a half [tim]es more likely to occur when the ef[fects] of alcohol were boosted by a drug.

Addressing the *Deutsche Verkehrs[wacht]* meeting in Innsbruck, Professor [Wa]gner said that between 20 and 25 per [cent] of accidents he had studied throughout Germany in which the dri[ver] had an alcohol level of less than [0.0]8 per cent were essentially due to [dru]gs.

The conclusion was that breathalyser [che]cks for alcohol were not enough. [T]here should be tests for drugs as well. [T]he law should set an upper limit for [dru]gs.

In a study limited to the Saar, he had [f]ound drugs in 18.2 per cent of the [b]lood samples taken from people the police had stopped for driving erratically.

In 13 per cent of the cases, the drug level was so high that the driver should not have been driving.

The most frequent drugs were barbiturates commonly used in sleeping pills and tranquillisers.

In one test, 23.7 per cent of drug-connected accidents involved people with an alcohol level of below 0.08 per cent.

The meeting was told that tests for drugs posed no technical problems. Despite this, the connection between drugs and fitness to drive was still largely ignored because police usually concentrated on checking the amount of alcohol in the blood.

The legal position on drugs and driving is that it is up to the driver to ensure that his reflexes are unimpaired.

Action against a driver is only taken if he has become conspicuous to the police. But once a driver does draw attention to himself, it is usually too late.

The problem lies in the risky grey zone where no erratic driving is evident and it is here there is no legal help. Experts are only called in when clear facts show that a person has become a menace on the road.

It is doubtful whether the introduction of detailed guidelines for a driver's licence, as laid down in the first stage of the provisions for an EEC driver's licence, and regular control check-ups would help.

But it must be ensured that the individual does not endanger the community as a whole because there are too few regulations.

What matters is to tell the public about the dangers through institutions, the media and doctors.

The doctor must tell the patient how to ensure that drugs do not impair his driving ability. The final decision rests with the patient but the doctor can at least say that he pointed out the risks.

But it would be wrong to consider only the side effects without balancing them against a drug's positive effects.

The Innsbruck seminar showed that, when weighing risks against benefits, doctors opt in favour of benefits when it comes to treating cardiovascular disorders.

Germany has 4.5 million drivers with high blood pressure. Drugs to reduce the blood pressure could make them fit to drive again.

But doctors at the meeting rejected the use of drugs which affect the central nervous system because they could lead to dryness in the mouth, a lack of concentration and tiredness.

Other drugs won approval. Included are the beta blocker range. They do not reduce alertness or slow the reactions.

In severe cases, drugs and faith in their effectiveness are not enough.

Professor Bernd Friedl and Herbert Lawerenz suggested that people with severe high blood pressure should have follow-up examinations at least every three years.

Another important suggestion was that drivers should proceed cautiously when beginning treatment for high blood pressure.

Ulrich Schmidt suggested that the phase in which the blood pressure changes from high to normal could temporarily affect a driver's reflexes. It is best not to drive at all during the first few days after starting treatment, he told the meeting.

Astrid Forberger
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 April 1983)

Liquor picker

This electronic device to measure the amount of alcohol in the blood is being tested by German police. It supersedes the breathalyser. (Photo: Drägerwerk)

Parents warned against giving children pharmaceuticals

Many German parents give their children drugs because they can't sleep, and have problems at school.

In a survey by the Federal Centre for Health Information, 42 per cent of the parents interviewed saw nothing wrong with giving children harmless drugs to improve their ability to concentrate.

The survey warns about drug company advertising. For example, these slogans:

"Helps in cases of physical and mental exhaustion, inability to concentrate and tiredness at school";

"Helps with flighty children and combats absentmindedness";

"Meaningfully supplements study for exams".

The Centre says sleeping pills and tranquillisers are extremely dangerous.

They hinder the child's activeness and can be habit forming.

Taken in excess, they can make children fidgety and cause insomnia. Worse still, they can lead to liver damage, the Centre says.

Drugs advertised as improving performance and the ability to concentrate mostly consist of lecithin, glutamic acids and vitamins.

But there was no need for them because diet should ensure an adequate supply of lecithin. One egg yolk a day was enough.

One glass of milk had more glutamic acid than a pharmaceutical preparation costing DM40.

It was scientifically not proved that glutamic acid improved mental performance.

It was better — and much cheaper — if B-group vitamins were taken in the form of natural foods. Grain products, legumes, nuts and meat all have plenty.

If a child is unable to concentrate properly there is usually a reason. Frequently it is tension between the parents or the birth of a baby and the fear of competition. In such cases, it is best to see a doctor.

And if the inability to concentrate be really due to vitamin deficiency, it is best remedied by a healthy, vitamin and protein-rich diet plus a multivitamin preparation.

If these intelligence pills have any effect at all, it is of a psychological nature by giving parents and children a straw to hang on to.

(Mannheimer Morgen, 9 April 1983)

■ OUR WORLD

Smiley's People, Smersh and that mob still hanging around in the German Cold

France has expelled 47 Soviet diplomats, journalists and businessmen for spying. It is not the first time a Western nation has made a mass expulsion of East Bloc envoys for this reason. It won't be the last. The Federal Republic of Germany is a favourite haunt for spies. Martin Ernst put this report together for *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt.*

East Bloc intelligence work in the Federal Republic is like in other major Western countries — it involves not just politics but also military, industrial, economic and research secrets.

Germany is a favourite place for spies because of its geographical position. It is also an important member of Nato, it is economically strong and its industry and research are highly developed.

Embassies, consulates and trade missions play a major role. They give agents a cover and immunity from prosecution. They can only be expelled.

On 24 June 1981, German security officers arrested the manager of a Munich firm, Laser Electronic, and his wife as they met with the deputy leader of the Soviet trade mission, Viktor Petrovich Shepelev.

Shepelev was not only on the trade mission. He was a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) officer. His tactics en route to meeting contacts kept German counter-intelligence officers busy.

He would wander through Munich for hours, apparently without purpose. Sometimes he would go into deserted side streets and then re-emerge and go off in another direction.

His car, easily recognisable as belonging to the Soviet mission, would be left far from the meeting place.

Shepelev specialised in getting strategically important electronic devices which are on the export embargo of Cocom.

Cocom, consisting of the Nato countries (except Iceland) and Japan, is the organisation that decides, on a strategic basis, what should be allowed to be exported to East Bloc countries.

Shepelev failed in 1979 to get a military laser range finder but he managed to get hold of a carbon dioxide laser for DM100,000 in cash.

The device was ordered in Britain, sent to a freight forwarder in Vienna and sent on from there to Moscow.

Shepelev was expelled from the Federal Republic in July 1981. A colleague, Vladimir Kolchenko, also had to go, two months later. He had offered to manager of a company called Varioline DM26,000 to get a night sighting device.

Several months before Kolchenko, acting for Aviaexport, the Soviet trade agency, had tried to obtain aviation information.

A tough luck case was Genadiy Arkadyevich Batashev. He was arrested outside the Germanic Museum in Cologne in mid-February this year. His misfortune was to have operated without diplomatic immunity, meaning that he has to stand trial instead of being expelled.

Batashev's plan was to buy data transmission and coding devices on the Cocom list through a management consultant and to obtain classified EEC documents and sophisticated electronic components. But the KGB agent's plans came to nought when German counter-intelligence officers intervened.

Other East Bloc countries also try to get Cocom items.

Thus, for instance, the Czechoslovakian intelligence agency's Department for Science and Technology works with the Prague Ministry for Technological and Investment Development which, in its turn, controls several intelligence agents at the Czech embassy in Bonn.

The number of known Czechoslovakian intelligence agents operating at the Bonn embassy rose considerably in 1981, according to German counter-intelligence.

Military espionage, procurement of Cocom goods, surveillance of emigrants and scientific and economic espionage are seen as the major functions of this group.

Czechoslovakia's electronics ministry, which was established in April 1980, seemed in a particular hurry. It instructed Prague's embassy in Bonn to either buy or obtain blueprints for such electronic components as microprocessors.

The embassy employees working for the secret service are supported by members of the Czechoslovakian trade mission in Cologne.

Pavel Stohr, second secretary at the Czechoslovakian Embassy, even succeeded in becoming a full-fledged member of the German Society for Position Fixing and Navigation (DGON).

DGON, supported by Bonn and the individual states of the Federal Republic of Germany, develops radar, radio and space technology.

The Prague foreign trade company, Omnipol is also involved in this game. It enlisted German businessmen to obtain parts and information relating to the German Leopard II tank and the multi-role combat aircraft, the Tornado.

Even small East Bloc countries like Bulgaria are hoping to achieve a "transfer of technology" free of charge.

A commercial attaché at the Bulgarian embassy in Bonn attracted the attention of German counter-intelligence officers when he approached various German companies in a bid to obtain electronic devices and components in the fields of laser, communications, radiation, precision, semiconductor and similar technologies.

To beat Cocom's restrictions, Sofia's man in Bonn (who frequently acts as a private individual rather than an embassy employee) makes a point of ordering the items in very small and inconspicuous numbers.

Even disregarding the strategic damage, the commercial harm caused by this kind of operation is enormous.

The number of known or suspected spies among the employees of official and semi-official Soviet missions in the Federal Republic of Germany (total staff 408) is rising.

According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, there are 109 known Soviet agents. Another 77 are suspected, among them 19 out of 23 Soviet media correspondents in the Bonn/Cologne region and all seven correspondents accredited in West Berlin.

The increase at the Soviet embassy in Bonn first became conspicuous in 1981. Especially the military attaché (the post was created in 1976) expanded his staff from the original three to nine in 1981. All are members of the GRU military intelligence service.

The Soviet military missions to the armed forces of the three Western Allies, stationed in Frankfurt, Baden-Baden and Bünde (Westphalia), are staffed entirely by GRU experts. There are currently 50.

Their task is to spy on the Bundeswehr and Nato troops in Germany.

In the course of extensive reconnaissance trips (increasingly done at night), they frequently show up at strategically important installations such as armament, energy and communications centres. They also nose around roads, rail tracks, waterways and harbour installations.

They often use muddy and therefore illegible car licence plates and leather jackets worn over uniform tunics.

On 30 January this year a Soviet military mission (SMM) car from Bünde was involved in a traffic accident in a prohibited Bundeswehr installation in Schleswig-Holstein.

The number of such incidents rose from 47 in 1980 to 87 in 1981.

SMM spies are becoming increasingly aggressive, and car chases a little like those in James Bond films are no rarity these days.

The latest incident happened on 5 April, two kilometres from the nuclear research centre in Jülich in North Rhine-Westphalia.

After a wild chase, the police managed to stop an SMM vehicle whose passengers instantly claimed dip[lomatic] immunity.

There is also every reason to [...] that these Soviet military cow[...] vide their fellow-spies with "[...] assistance."

It is hardly a coincidence th[...] viet agent set up his "dead le[...] along the route of one of his G[...] leagues.

This is given weight by the sp[...] lar flight of the East German ag[...] ner Fülle who was supposed [...] out nuclear secrets and who so[...] fuge at the Baden-Baden SMM [...] the East German agent Werne[...] defected in January 1979, comp[...] a list of spies operating in this co[...]

Hidden in a wooden crate, [...] viets transported him back to Ea[...] many.

Disgruntled with life in East G[...] ny, Fülle returned to West G[...] amid great publicity.

The head of the Baden-Bade[...] Major General Vladimir Klime[...] recalled to Moscow temporarily [...] tember 1981 and replaced for g[...] July. It is indicative of how safe [...] GRU experts feel in Germany [...] once they have been uncove[...] continue with their work as if [...] had happened.

For instance, two KGB spies [...] as diplomats at Moscow's Bon[...] sy are still in their posts altho[...] were unmasked by an Americ[...] as far back as 1974. The Sovi[...] did not deny their activities.

In mid-1981 Felix Vinograd[...] Soviet trade mission in Cologn[...] "turn" a Hamburg intelligenc[...] using a KGB agent for a job.

Much of the intelligence ac[...] rected against West Germany is [...] out by the GDR although its [...] have maintained a low pro[...] made no major headlines lately.

A former fellow prisoner of [...] German border guard Wern[...] hold who fled to West German[...] reported that he had been app[...] by a member of the GDR mi[...] Bonn. It was suggested to him [...] help to kidnap Weinhold, w[...] GDR wanted for murder in co[...] with his armed escape.

As opposed to other Comm[...] telligence agencies, the GDR [...] allow its top operatives to wor[...] Germany in an official capacity.

Instead, they tended to depe[...] called "illegals" whose infiltr[...] this country has diminished dr[...] ly due to successes of West Ge[...] counter-intelligence.

This has prompted the GDR [...] equip its spies with genuine bio[...] cal data and send them over as [...] migrants or refugees.

For the counter-intelligence [...] in West Germany, this amounts [...] ing needles in the haystack of [...] 12,000 and 15,000 East Germa[...] come to the West every year.

So GDR spies, unlike the R[...] have to do without diplomatic i[...] ty. If Chancellor Kohl wanted [...] late France's President Mitter[...] ordering a mass expulsion of [...] spies — which is most unlike[...] Soviet embassy in Bonn would [...] self with only half its normal sta[...] the East German mission would [...] out unscathed.

The GDR spy system has no[...] do with consideration for the oth[...] many or with a decision to forgo [...] cular actions. It only has to do w[...] tics — as shown by the Guillaume [...]

Martin E[...]

(Rheinischer Merkur/Chris[...] 15 A[...])

Continued from page 11

Beifuss, Jürgen Salk and Rainer Wanzelius.

In the unending idyll of the East Frisian countryside they portray a woman who hunts ducks for a living, lives without electricity or running water and quotes marvellous extracts from her "fan mail" in which she is hailed as a dropout.

Two other outstanding entries were Pavel Schnabel's *Überleben* and Maria Lang's *Familiengruft*.

In *Überleben* (Survival) cameraman Schnabel, who in this instance is more important than director Hartmut Schoen, portrays with uncanny sensitivity a man who is so oppressed by the sameness of his daily routine that he sees taking part in a marathon as his last chance. He survives — by dropping out.

Familiengruft (Family Vault), subtitled A Love Poem to My Mother, is Maria Lang's first film. It is one the international jury seems to have missed.

She wields the fascination of an entirely subjective film language to make an extraordinary emotional confession full of silent accusation, fragile and charming detachment and subjective personal proximity.

For 10 minutes the new subjectivity has a field day.

Michael Schmitz

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 18 April 1983)



MODERN LIVING

Expensive soft-drink policy in pubs is luring youth to alcohol, accuses MP

[...] Bonn Bundestag MP is threatening [...] to take court action to force the ca[...]ng industry to reduce the price of [...] drinks.

[Jo]sef Linsmeier, a CSU member and [la]wyer, blames publicans and bar ow[ners] for excessive consumption of alco[hol] by young people.

He says they sell beer too cheaply. [...] drinks should be cut to offer a [com]petitive choice.

Herr Linsmeier has done his research [in] his local youth club where the price [of] a Coke has been cut to 50 pfennigs. [...]and for beer (DM2) has dropped [subs]tantially.

[In] Germany beer is cheaper than soft [drin]ks in places where young people [mee]t such as bars and discos. Soft drink [is ge]nerally bought wholesale a third [chea]per than beer and sold over the [...] at a third more.

[Y]outh and consumer organisations [hav]e been campaigning for years to get [pric]ing policies changed. They say the [syste]m now is an invitation to drink [...] instead of something non-alcoho[lic]. The 8,000 or so discotheques come in [for] particularly trenchant criticism. The [...]le played both keeps young people [on] the hop and sales of drink brisk and [prof]itable.

[A C]oke or a bottle of soda water often [cost]s DM2.50, whereas a beer may cost [as] little as DM1.20 to DM1.50, with the [res]ult that many young people never [sto]p to think.

[Th]ey order a beer, then usually an[othe]r. In up-market discos the differ[ence] in price between beer and soft [drin]ks is even more striking.

[W]ith beer at DM3 and a Coke at [DM]6, it is predictable what will be [dru]nk. Even in those discos where [drin]ks are all the same price people [ten]d to order alcohol because they feel [it is] better value.

[M]ost Germans still look on beer as a [...]y harmless drink: a quencher of [thirs]t and a liquid foodstuff. But narco[tics] experts tend to look on it as the [chea]pest road to addiction.

Many people have yet to appreciate [that] beer, too, is alcohol," says Profes[sor] Hanns Hippius of the psychiatric [clin]ic at Munich University Hospital.

[T]here is a lot of youth alcoholism. A [surv]ey in Bavaria has revealed that 37 [per] cent of Bavarian juveniles, or [...]000 youngsters, are beer-drinkers.

[Si]xty-nine per cent, or 1,560,000, oc[casio]nally drink alcohol, while in Ger[man]y as a whole about 100,000 under[-age]s are classified as alcoholics.

[It] may be difficult to explain to many [that] beer, just like schnapps, is alcohol. [I]t is even harder to understand why [it] is so often much less expensive [than] soft drinks in bars and discos [wher]e young people congregate.

[...] less expensive it is. Bar-owners [buy] soft drinks for roughly a third less [than] beer yet sell it for at least a third [more].

[A] 100-litre barrel of beer costs on [aver]age DM150, as against DM100 for [a ba]rrel of mineral water. That comes, [at le]ast on paper, to 500 small beers [selli]ng at, say, DM1.20, or a total turno[ver] of DM600.

[...] publicans can hardly argue that an [...] higher profit margin on soft drinks [is a]n economic necessity.

Yet they blame the breweries. Breweries sell soft drinks too but urge publicans to sell mainly beer, say the publicans.

They say they are forced by the terms of their contract with the breweries to sell beer cheapest.

Breweries do indeed lean on customers. Loans are made against an obligation to order such and such a quantity of beer in a given period.

Publicans tied by terms such as these are naturally under pressure to push the sales of beer. Often too, the more they sell the higher the profit margin.

Breweries disclaim responsibility. They say they don't dictate prices in any way. Publicans are free to charge what they want and to sell non-alcoholic drinks for the same price as their beer, or less, if they want to.

So the two brewers' associations lay the blame fairly and squarely at the retailers' door, while publicans just as energetically disclaim responsibility for alcoholism among the young.

"Alcoholism," says Frithjof Wahl of the Hotel and Catering Association, "begins at home." Yet he admits that pricing could be dangerous.

That is why the association advises members to sell at least one non-alcoholic drink for no more than the price they charge for the cheapest alcoholic one.

Publicans and caterers are unlikely to take kindly to this recommendation. They calculate turnover by the number of chairs they have, and no-one likes to see a customer spending too much time sipping at a glass of mineral water.

Beer-drinkers, in contrast, are always welcome. Experience shows that they either leave after the first couple of beers or stay for more (and down them fast). Beer soon goes stale.

Beer is not for nothing the cheapest drink in many bars.

Bavarian Economic Affairs Minister Anton Jaumann feels this is a very short-sighted outlook. More than once he has appealed to publicans to sell at least one non-alcoholic drink for no more than the price of a beer.

There are consumer reasons why he is so insistent on this advice. He feels many fathers are reluctant to take the family out for a drink because non-alcoholic drinks for the children are even more expensive than the beer.

A survey for the Bonn Youth and Family Affairs Ministry would certainly seem to suggest that providing at least one non-alcoholic drink for the same price as a beer would be an effective contribution toward the campaign against youth alcoholism.

Over 7,000 young people aged between 12 and 24 were asked whether they would do without alcohol if a non-alcoholic drink were the cheapest on the menu.

Forty-five per cent said they never touched alcohol; 31 per cent said they would still drink alcohol; and 23 per cent said they would swap to the non-alcoholic drink.

Herr Linsmeier has had the issue probed from the legal angle in a survey drawn up for him by the backroom boys at the Bonn Bundestag.

They say that publicans (and there are many of them) who charge the same price or more for non-alcoholic drinks as for alcoholic beverages are in breach of the Licensed Premises Act.

They also say that the prices charged for non-alcoholic drinks must in general be lower than for alcoholic ones.

Wolfgang Hoffmann

(Die Zeit, 8 April 1983)

Lifeline for young victims of 'religious Pied Pipers'

West Berlin municipal authorities and the Protestant Church have set up a telephone "lifeline" for young people in need of help to break with obscure religious denominations.

The aim is to help fight controversial youth sects and religious Pied Pipers and to provide a point of contact for young people who are unable to quit under their own steam.

Thomas Gandow, 36, the Protestant minister who runs the service, says sects and youth religions have a firm hold on over 10,000 young people in the city.

So a special unit of the municipal youth department has been set up to work full-time on observation and analysis of the activities and recruitment methods of roughly 500 religious youth groups in Berlin.

Rev. Gandow has lent a helping hand to young people keen to break with such groups, and to their families, who are often on the verge of despair, since 1978.

Berlin more than other German cities is seen by youth sects as the foremost test market and centre of activities at present, he says.

His interest in them dates back to February 1978, when Ananda Margis Helmut Kleinknecht, 28, and Erika Ruppert, 24, committed suicide.

On the steps of the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, on Kurfürstendamm, they poured petrol over themselves and set themselves on fire as a gesture of personal sacrifice to their guru.

Many youth sects have long been realised to be dangerous. They exert massive psychological pressure on young people who are often forced to break with friends and parents and made financially dependent.

The dangerous sects, in the opinion of specialists, include the Bhagwan movement, the Scientology Church, the AAO (short for Aktionsanalytische Organisation) and the Process Ranette association.

Gandow feels the reason why they are so attracted by Berlin is that the city is a centre where, more than anywhere else in Germany, young people are engaged in a quest for identity and a sense of community.

Initial invitations are to unexceptionable discussion groups, stage performances and nature cure or slimming courses.

At these courses young people are brought under psychological control by means of meditation, hypnosis and mystical rites.

Some groups show no lack of imagination in gaining access to public funds. Rev. Gandow cites as an example the AAO, an organisation set up by Austrian artist Otto Muehl.

It established a charitable foundation innocuously entitled the Welfare Education Association that invested DM3.5m in a villa in Steglitz, West Berlin, for use as a youth centre.

This youth centre is said to have received up to DM1.5m in public subsidies.

Newcomers to the AAO are said to undergo macabre concentration camp games as a test of their obedience. In them they are subjected to abject humiliation against a background of loudspeaker gunfire and Hitler speeches.

A Berlin offshoot of the Bhagwan movement recently opened a discotheque on Kurfürstendamm in the heart of the city, doubtless to recruit new members and not just to keep existing sannyasis on their toes.

Rev. Gandow offers help and advice to young people who have fallen for profit-conscious apostles of salvation in various ways.

In addition to his telephone lifeline (Berlin 833 30 90) he is associated with a parents' group, the Parental Initiative Against Mental Dependence and Religious Extremism.

This group has ties with a countrywide organisation with its head office in Bonn.

F. Diederichs

(Die Welt, 12 April 1983)

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the Christian militia in southern Lebanon, and his men.

Israel views them as the sole guarantee that PLO units will not return in the foreseeable future and threaten its northern border and border areas again.

Jerusalem is afraid Washington might exert pressure to persuade Israel to dispense with Major Haddad or agree to some compromise or other that only exists on paper.

President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz can expect renewed pressure from Congress, the Senate and US public opinion to withdraw the marines from Lebanon.

America has yet to overcome the trauma of Vietnam.

Doubt and frustration are widespread in Jerusalem too. The number of ministers who favour unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and decoupling from what they feel is a problem that defies solution may still be small, but they are gaining increasing support.

Israel has so far banked on the Christians and been disappointed time and again. But the Moslems are not prepared to negotiate with Jerusalem for fear of neighbouring Moslem countries.

The Druses are on good terms with Damascus, whereas the Shi'ites are basically influenced by Tehran.

Israeli officials are already wondering what use an agreement is that is signed by a government that is not even in control in its own capital city, Beirut.

Joseph Canaan

(Handelsblatt, 20 april 1983)